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FIRE DAMAGE TO CARGO
"A little fire is quickly trodden out,
where being suffer'd, rivers cannot quench."1
I. INTRODUCTION
Early in the evening of January 13, 1840, the steamboat Lexing-
ton lay off the Huntington lighthouse on Long Island Sound, three
hours out from New York City and bound for Stonington, Con-
necticut.2 Suddenly, the cry dreaded by mariners through the cen-
turies rang out: "The ship's afire!" Within minutes, flames con-
sumed the vessel. The lives of all the passengers and crew were
lost; all property on board was destroyed. The ship carried among
its cargo an unmarked crate containing eighteen thousand dollars
in gold and silver coins belonging to William F Harnden. Harnden
regularly shipped similar crates for businesses in New York and
Boston. The contract of carriage provided that the crate was "at all
times exclusively at the risk" of Mr. Harnden and that the carrier,
the New Jersey Steam Navigation Company, would not, "in any
event, be responsible, either to him [Mr. Harnden] or Ins employ-
ers for the loss of any . money . or property of any and every
description, to be conveyed or transported by him in said crate
"3
The ship's pilot report cataloged the crew's frantic efforts to ex-
tinguish the fire. When the crew sought fire buckets, "two or three
only, in all could be found, and but one of them properly prepared
and fitted with heaving lines; and, in the emergency, the specie
boxes were emptied, and used to carry water."4 Despite the lan-
guage of the contract, the United States Supreme Court held the
carrier liable for the lost specie.5
Concurrent with the Lexington decision,' the United States was
1. W. SHAKESPEARE, KING HENRY VI, Part 3, Act IV, sc. viii, 1.7 (Great Books ed. 1952).
2. The New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. The Merchant's Bank of Boston (The Lex-
ington), 47 U.S. (6 How.) 344, 347 (1848).
3. Id. at 345
4. Id. at 384.
5. Id. at 385.
6. For discussion on the impetus to secure protective legislation provided by the Lexing-
ton case and other similar decisions, see Thede, Statutory Limitations (Other Than Harter
and COGSA) of Carrer's Liability to Cargo-Limitation of Liability and the Fire Statute,
45 TUL. L. REv. 959 (1971).
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trying to establish its Merchant Marine as a significant competitor
of the British and other European shipping industries. American
law of marine cargo damage retarded competitive growth because
the American law unduly favored cargo interests.7 American courts
used land-based common carrier law to hold that any contractual
clause that excused or limited liability of the maritime common
carrier for the negligent acts of its carrier, of its servants, or its
agents was contrary to public policy Regarding cargo damage from
fire, the carrier was viewed as an "insurer" of the cargo," and could
escape liability only in the event of an Act of God, acts of a public
enemy, or an inherent defect of the cargo.' Consistent with the
general rule, any attempt of the carrier to escape liability for fire
damage to cargo due to negligence either of the carrier or of the
carrier's servants or agents was invalid. Across the Atlantic, how-
ever, British courts used the freedom of contract doctrine routinely
to uphold negligence clauses in maritime contracts for cargo car-
riage. 10 Indeed, the English 1786 statute1 insulated the carrier
from all liability for negligent fire damage to cargo. The burden of
such cargo loss fell solely upon the cargo owner.
In 1851, three years after the Lexington disaster, the United
States shipping interests sought legislative relief. Rather than
seeking to overturn entrenched judicial policies, the shippers
sought a limit on established liability Shipowners achieved that
aim in the passage of the Limitation of Shipowner's Liability Act
7. See generally G. Gu.MORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 139-44, 818-19 (2d ed.
1975) [hereinafter cited as GILMORE & BLACK]; H. LONGLEY, COMMON CARRIAGE OF CARGO ch.
1 (1967); Donovan, The Origins and Development of Limitation of Shipowners' Liability,
53 TuL. L REv. 999 (1979); Kierr, The Effect of Direct Action Statutes on P&I Insurance,
on Various Other Insurances of Maritime Liabilities, and on Limitation of Shipowners'
Liability, 43 TuL. L. REv. 638 (1969); Comment, The Allocation of the Burden of Proof in
Marine Fire Damage Cases, 50 U. OF CHI. L. REv. 1146 (1983).
8. The New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. The Merchant's Bank of Boston (The Lex-
ington), 47 U.S. (6 How) at 381; 2A BENEDICT ON ADMIRALTY 14-1 (7th ed. 1984) [hereinafter
cited as BENEDICT].
9. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 139-40; BENEDICT supra note 8, at 2-1.
10. See generally supra note 7.
11. English Act of 26 Geo. 3, ch. 86 (1786), cited in GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at
819. Donovan, supra note 7, at 1008 n.68, quotes the then British "Fire Statute," section 2
of the Act. The British statute then protected the shipowner from all negligence as to fire
damage to cargo.
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("Limitation Act")12 In general, the Limitation Act provides that
if legal liability is established against a shipowner and if certain
requirements are met, the shipowner can limit liability to the value
of the owner's interest in the vessel and pending freight."3
One section of the Limitation Act, commonly known as the "Fire
Statute,' 4 provides:
No owner of any vessel shall be liable to answer for or make
good to any person any loss or damage, which may happen to
any merchandise whatsoever, which shall be shipped, taken m,
or put on board any such vessel, by reason or by means of any
fire happening to or on board the vessel, unless such fire is
caused by the design or neglect of such owner.
The statute protects vessel owners and "bareboat" charterers,15
but not voyage or time charterers.
In 1936, Congress enacted as part of the Carriage of Goods by
Sea Act6 ("COGSA") a second fire provision:
(2) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for
loss or damage arising or resulting from (b) Fire, unless
caused by the actual fault or privity of the carrier.'7
The COGSA Fire Provision applies to the "carrier." COGSA de-
fines a carrier as the vessel owner or the charterer, including voy-
age or time charterers, who enters into a contract of carriage with a
shipper, where the contract is covered by a bill of lading or some
other similar document of title."i
COGSA expressly states that it does not revoke or modify the
Fire Statute. Thus, in various instances one or both statutory pro-
visions may apply While recognizing that the two provisions vary
as to those eligible to benefit, this Article uses the term "carrier"
for convenience when speaking of either provision. Also, the Article
12. For the current version, see 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-188 (1982).
13. See generally 3 BENEDICT, supra note 8, chs. I-V; supra note 7; see also Thede, supra
note 6.
14. 46 U.S.C. § 182 (1982).
15. 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1982) (describing a bareboat charterer, treats such as an owner for
the Linitation Act, of which the Fire Statute is a part).
16. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1982).
17. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(b) (1982).
18. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(a), (b) (1982).
1985]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
refers to both provisions as the "Fire Provisions" because courts
universally treat both provisions as having essentially the same
meaning in determining carrier liability for fire damage to cargo.19
Finally, the term "cargo owner" refers to the party in interest
claiming for damage to cargo.
This Article has several purposes. First, because the leading
works in American maritime law are surprisingly "thin" in this
area,20 this Article attempts to provide a comprehensive outline of
modern American maritime law regarding fire damage to cargo.
Second, because the purposes of and analytical frameworks for the
Fire Provisions and the Limitation Act are distinct, this Article
severs the Fire Provisions from the "dragging anchor" of the Limi-
tation Act and contends that because of differing policies, courts
should not shackle the Fire Provisions with the restrictive modern
treatment of the Limitation Act. Finally, the Article analyzes judi-
cial trends in the law of fire damage over the 130 year life of the
Fire Provisions. Because several "heresies"' currently threaten the
established law of fire damage, this Article identifies those heresies
and performs an auto-da-f6 to reorient present treatment of the
Fire Provisions with congressional intent and the long-established
American maritime law of fire damage.
More specifically, Part II of the Article identifies the confusion
of the Fire Provisions with the Limitation Act as the first heresy 22
The Article contends that these statutory provisions are distinct
19. GnLMoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 161; see, e.g., In re Complaint of Ta Chli Naviga-
tion (Panama) Corp., S.A., 677 F.2d 225, 228-29, 1982 A.M.C. 1710, 1713-14 (2d Cir. 1982)
(citing legislative history and court decisions).
20 See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 161, 879-98. Most of the discussion is on limi-
tation of liability cases even where the issues are the same for the Fire Provisions, and many
Fire Provisions issues simply are not raised. See, e.g., 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-1 to
14-38, 12-25 to 12-29; H. LONGLEY, supra note 7, ch. 15 (with exception of updating of cita-
tions, BENEDICT is virtually a verbatim restatement of Longley's work); W. TETLnEY, MARINE
CARGO CLAIMS ch. 15 (2d ed. 1978).
21. This Article uses the metaphor of heresy in a tongue-m-cheek fashion. New truth in
any field of thought is by nature heretical, in the sense of challenging entrenched perspec-
tives and standards. Therefore, "heresy" in the law is not only good; it is essential. All
heresy, however, is not necessarily new truth. All heresy requires close examination. Heresy
which advances on the sly feet of unexamined, inaccurate premises, of false analogies, or of
other similar failures of thought or research, like those dealt with in this Article, merits a
swift end. In the American maritime law of fire damage to cargo, the courts generally have
avoided the confusion inherent in these heresies.
22. See infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
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and the judicial hostility to the Limitation Act should not apply to
the Fire Provisions. Part III of the Article examines the requisite
qualifications for Fire Provision protection while Part IV analyzes
the heart of the Fire Provisions, the substantive requirement that
the carrier is not liable for damage unless the carrier's own per-
sonal negligence caused the fire.
The second heresy is the confusion of the maritime doctrine of
unseaworthmess with the Fire Provisions. The third heresy is
closely related: the application of the Canadian case, Maxine Foot-
wear, Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine, Ltd.23 and
the Canadian COGSA to American law, allowing the doctrine of
unseaworthiness to override the Fire Provisions. The effect of each
of these heresies on their principal disciple, the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, is analyzed in the context
of Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd.24
Part V of this Article analyzes the burdens of proof under the
Fire Provisions. Part VI examines the judicial standards for show-
ing personal negligence of the carrier. Part VII examines ways in
which the carrier might lose the benefit of the Fire Provisions,
waiver and deviation, and reveals the treatment of deviation as a
tort to be the fourth heresy The Article concludes that courts gen-
erally apply the Fire Provisions in a balanced, reasoned manner
and, with the exception of these heresies, also maintain congres-
sional policy for allocation of the risks of loss between the carrier
and the cargo owner.
II. DISTINGUISHING THE FIRE PROVISIONS FROM THE LIMITATION
ACT
A. The Nature and Purpose of the Fire Provisions
In the specific case of cargo damage by fire, the Fire Statute
eliminated the general maritime rule that the carrier was liable to
the cargo owner for fire damage under nearly all circumstances.
The Fire Statute removed strict liability in tort and restricted the
ground for a negligence action to personal acts by the carrier.25
23. 1959 A.C. 589, [1959] 2 Lloyd's List LR. 105.
24. 692 F.2d 1327, 1979 A.M.C. 2787 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
25. See Gn.MoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 161; 2A BENEDICr, supra note 8, at 14-30;
Thede, supra note 6, at 982, 984. A leading early case is Walker v. The Transportation Co.,
1985]
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The Fire Statute is not a limitation of liability. The Fire Statute
does not limit the extent of damages payable on a previously es-
tablished liability; instead, the Fire Statute establishes that there
is no right of action on the basis of vicarious liability Thus, under
the Fire Statute, the carrier commits no actionable wrong until
negligent conduct directly attributable to the carrier occurs and
causes fire damage to cargo. Once a cargo owner shows that a car-
rier's personal negligence is the cause of the fire damage to the
cargo, the carrier is liable and the Fire Statute does not operate to
limit that established liability
American cases rarely discuss the policies underlying the Fire
Statute. In a British case, Louis Dreyfus & Co. v. Tempus Ship-
ping Co., 26 however, the House of Lords discussed the current Brit-
ish counterpart of the American Fire Statute, section 502 of the
British Merchant Shipping Act of 1894. In Louis Dreyfus, the fire
was caused by unseaworthy coal bunkers and the carrier was held
without "fault or privity." In the absence .of personal negligence by
the shipowner, the House of Lords stated that "there [was] no ac-
tionable wrong committed by the shipowner. '28 Particularly, the
House of Lords denied the cargo owner's claim that the statute
exempted the shipowner from paying damages for what was still in
legal doctrine an actionable wrong. Lord Dunedin dealt with the
argument concisely: "I think that argument is the argument of a
drowning man. An actionable wrong for which you can recover
70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 150 (1865). "We are, therefore, of opinion that in reference to fires occur-
ring on that class of vessels to which the statute applies, the owner is not liable for the
misconduct of the officers and mariners of the vessel in which he does not participate per-
sonally." Id. at 153; see also Complaint of Ta Chi Navigation, 677 F.2d at 228-29.
26. 1931 A.C. 726.
27. Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, 57 & 58 Vict. ch. 60, § 502 (the British Fire Statute).
By 1894 the British Fire Statute was equivalent to the American Fire Statute. The term
"fault or privity" in the British Act held the same meaning as "design or neglect" in the
American Statute. The British Statute provided that
[t]he owner of a British seagoing ship, or any share therein, shall not be liable
to make good to any extent whatever any loss or damage happening without
his actual fault or privity in the following cases; namely-(i) where any goods,
merchandise, or other thing whatsoever taken in or put on board his ship are
lost or damaged by reason of fire on board the ship.
Id.
28. Louis Dreyfus, 1931 A.C. at 738.
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nothing is a contradiction in terms."2 9 The House of Lords contin-
ued, "[A] statutory limitation of liability of course does not [have
this effect]: it leaves the fault actionable ,,"o
The American Fire Statute is neither an "exemption" to nor an
"immunity" from liability, although courts commonly use those
terms to describe its effect. Both terms envision an underlying es-
tablished liability arising on some basis of action that, but for the
"exemption" or "immunity", would provide relief to the cargo
owner. For example, the Harter Act31 and COGSA 2 provide ex-
emptions for damage to cargo caused by negligent navigation or
management of the vessel. Those exemptions presuppose an action
for negligence in navigation or in vessel management that has es-
tablished owner liability. The Harter Act or COGSA then operate
statutorily to provide an exemption from that established liability.
Under the Fire Statute, however, the non-negligent shipowner sim-
ply has no liability from which to be exempted. Gilmore and Black
best describe the Fire Statute's effect on vicarious liability for fire
damage as "exoneration."3 3 The carrier is exonerated or "declared
blameless" for nonpersonal negligence. Conversely, negligent con-
duct directly attributable to the carrier will give rise to liability,
with no change whatsoever made by the Fire Statute, and with no
suggestion of exemption for that liability.
The exceptionally grave risk posed by shipboard fire is one of
the reasons for this special and, for American maritime law in
1851, extraordinary relief for carriers.3 4 "Fire is the peril most
dreaded by all mariners, and a peril most difficult to combat in a
fully laden ship."3 5 In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,
vessels of oak and sail, using tons of pitch and other highly inflam-
mable substances, were torches awaiting the match. Early steam-
29. Id. at 739.
30. Id. at 747.
31. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1982). Section 192 contains the negligent navigation or manage-
ment exemptions.
32. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1982). Section 1304(2)(a) contains the negligent navigation or
management exemptions.
33. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 834, 877, 879.
34. "From earliest times fire has been one of the most terrifying perils of the sea which
perhaps explains why a special exception has been made for it." W. TEy, supra note 20,
at 183.
35. In re Liberty Shipping Corp., 509 F.2d 1249, 1250 (9th Cir. 1975).
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ships were not markedly safer. The lack of adequate fire-fighting
equipment virtually guaranteed catastrophe. Even today, despite
steel ships and vastly improved fire-fighting equipment, fire con-
tmues to be a primary hazard because of volatile cargos and the
large amount of inflammable substances used in vessel operations.
Because the risk of fire remains almost unchanged since 1851, the
congressional policy of the Fire Statute-allowing the carrier, in
the absence of personal negligence, to allocate the burden of fire
damage among the vessel, each shipper, and its cargo-likewise re-
mains the appropriate allocation of risk.
B. The First Heresy: Confusing the Fire Provisions and the Limi-
tation Act
Gilmore and Black, in their leading treatise,3 6 discuss the Fire
Provisions almost entirely within the context of the Limitation
Act. Because of their differing policies, appraisal of the Fire Provi-
sions m the context of the Limitation Act is a warped focus for
analysis that invites conceptual confusion and doctrinal error. This
warped focus can result in an indiscriminate pour-over onto the
Fire Provision of the law and policy analysis that properly pertains
only to the Limitation Act. Because the Fire Provisions and the
Limitation Act are separate legal entities with differing law and
policies, this Article terms the confusion of the two as the first her-
esy Gilmore and Black recognized that separate treatment of the
statutes would be "handy" because "the Fire Provisions have a
separate history in American Law. '37 They go on, however, to give
the COGSA provision cursory treatment,3 8 and then, with a sugges-
tion 9 that whatever they say of the Fire Statute likewise applies to
the COGSA provision, refer the reader to their Limitation Act
coverage.
Another danger of this warped focus is that general hostility to-
ward the Limitation Act will undeservedly restrain the Fire Provi-
sions if the statutes are conceptually intertwined. In committing
36. See GILMoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 877-98.
37. GI.MORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 161.
38. Id. The COGSA Fire Provision is considered on only one page, and part of that con-
cerns the Fire Statute.
39. Id.
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the first heresy, Gilmore and Black allow their hostility toward the
Limitation Act to cloud their analysis of the Fire Provisions.40
The Fire Statute and the Limitation Act share only two things.
They were enacted at the same time and they both aid the carriage
of goods by shifting liabilities to cargo owners. In the latter objec-
tive, they are joined by the Harter Act and COGSA. In more sig-
nificant respects, the Fire Provisions and the Limitation Act are
quite different. As discussed earlier, the Fire Provisions deal with a
single risk, cargo damage by fire, and a single class of claimants,
cargo owners for damage to property interest in cargo. Congress
focused on the legal relationship between carrier and cargo owner
and used the Fire Statute to allocate the risk of loss between these
parties. Further, both parties involved generally are economically
viable, well organized in associations, and sophisticated. These par-
ties recognize the importance of determining in advance how best
to allocate, by insurance or otherwise, the burden established by
the legislative policy of the Fire Provisions. The statutes also differ
in operation. From the outset, the Fire Provisions remove vicarious
liability as a basis for a cause of action; they do not merely limit
liability on the basis of vicarious liability. Alternatively, if a court
finds an owner personally negligent, the owner is fully liable.
In contrast, under the general regime of the Limitation Act, if
the cargo owner establishes the shipowner's vicarious liability, the
Act allows the shipowner, nevertheless, to limit his damages if the
cargo owner's loss was not the direct result of the shipowner's neg-
ligence. Further, this opportunity to limit damages payable exists
not merely for the carriage of goods, but also extends to a broad
range of interests violated, such as personal injury, wrongful death,
or property damage. The shipowner's ability to limit payable dam-
ages is effective against a broad range of claimants, many of whom
possess only a limited capacity to shoulder the financial burdens of
their loss that result from the shipowner's ability to limit his
liability
For these reasons, the breadth and severity of effects caused by
risk allocation under the Limitation Act are far different from
40. See, GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 877-98. The authors devote only a single page
to specific comment on the COGSA Fire Provision. Id. at 161 (commenting that what is said
of the Fire Statute in context of the Limitation Act applies to the COGSA provision).
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those of the Fire Statute. Whether one views the policies underly-
ing the enactment of the Limitation Act as valid or, as do Gilmore
and Black,41 as obsolescent, disfunctional, and inimical to values
now granted increased priority, the point is that appraisal of the
Fire Statute through the Limitation Act analysis is inappropriate.
Ending such confusion alone would justify this Article.
The Article now scrutinizes judicial action in specific areas of the
law and attempts to determine whether courts adopt a restrictive
interpretation of the Fire Provisions and whether they confuse the
Fire Provisions with the Limitation Act. First, the Article consid-
ers the factors a carrier must demonstrate to gain the protection of
the Fire Provisions. Second, attention is focused on the two most
important features of the Fire Provisions-personal negligence and
burden of proof. 42 Third, the Article analyzes court decisions to de-
termine whether courts adopt a restrictive interpretation of the
Fire Provisions. The Article concludes by addressing two ways an
otherwise eligible carrier may lose the protection of the Fire Provi-
sions-waiver and deviation.
III. QUALIFYING FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE FIRE PROVISIONS
A. The Beneficiaries of the Fire Provisions
Consistent with the legislative policy of limiting the benefit of
the Fire Provisions to a discrete class of potential defendants,
courts applying the Fire Provisions first must determine whether
the defendant is a party protected by the statutes in a particular
situation. Because courts that are predisposed to limit the applica-
tion of the Fire Provisions are more likely to limit the class of ben-
eficiaries, analysis of judicial identification of the beneficiary class
provides insight into the attitude of the judiciary toward the Fire
Provisions.
Shipowners are the express beneficiaries of the Fire Statute. Be-
cause the Fire Statute was enacted as a provision of the Limitation
Act and because that Act provides that bareboat charterers are to
41. E.g., GuMoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 822-23, 843, 878, 882.
42. On the issue of burden of proof as to "design or neglect" or "actual fault or privity,"
Gilmore and Black contend that "[t]here is no reason why the allocation of the burden of
proof should be different in Fire Statute cases from the universally accepted allocation in
Limitation Act cases." GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 896.
[Vol. 26:569
FIRE DAMAGE TO CARGO
be treated as owners, bareboat charterers also may benefit from
the Fire Statute.4 This result is supported by the traditional
American maritime view that the bareboat charterer is treated as
an owner pro hac vice for many matters.44 The COGSA Fire Provi-
sion applies to anyone in a contractual relationship with a shipper
pursuant to a contract of carriage that is covered by a bill of lading
or some other similar document of title. A person in such a con-
tractual relationship with a shipper is called a "carrier." 45 Under
COGSA, therefore, any type of charterer would be a "carrier," in-
cluding a time or voyage charterer. Because both the Fire Statute
and the COGSA Fire Provision are treated as equivalent, Fire Pro-
vision protection presently extends to ship owners, bareboat char-
terers, time charterers, and voyage charterers.
In contrast to their British counterpart,46 the American Fire
Provisions may benefit foreign registered vessels. Courts might re-
quire such vessels to conform to United States safety requirements
before securing this benefit. Indeed, customary international law
recognizes the right of a State to condition access to its ports and
laws on whatever reasonable conditions the State chooses to un-
pose. Because Congress enacted the Fire Provisions to assist Amer-
ican shipping interests in competition with foreign slupping, re-
quiring foreign vessels to satisfy United States safety requirements
would both equalize costs and increase safety. The courts, however,
have refused to set such conditions on the use of the Fire Provi-
sions by foreign vessels. In Fidelity-Phoenix Fire Insurance Com-
pany of New York v. Flota Mercante del Estado (The Rio
Gualaguay),47 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth
43. 46 U.S.C. §§ 182, 186 (1982).
44. See GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 194; 46 U.S.C. § 973 (1971)(owner pro hac
vice for purpose of Federal Maritime Lien Act); Bossard v. Port Allen Marine Serv., 624
F.2d 671, 672-73 (5th Cir. 1980)(owner pro hac vzce for purpose of Longshoreman's and
Harbor Worker's Compensation Act, 46 U.S.C. §902(21)(1972)).
45. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1301(a), (b) (1982). Under COGSA, if the shipowner has not entered into
contract directly with the cargo owner and has not authorized a charterer to sign on the
owner's behalf when signing Bills of Lading, the owner will not be a "carrier" and will not
have in personamn liability under any Bill of Lading regarding the cargo owner. See Demsey
& Assoc. v. S.S. Sea Star, 461 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1972).
46. W. TETLEy, supra note 20, at 190 (quoting the current British provision in The
Merchant Shipping Act, 1894, part VIII, s. 502).
47. 205 F.2d 886, 1953 A.M.C. 1348 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 346 U.S. 415 (1953).
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Circuit held that "the fire statute is not by its terms so condi-
tioned." The Fifth Circuit relied on the United States Supreme
Court's language in Earle & Stoddart v. Ellerman's Wilson Line48
to the effect that the only exception to immunity in the Fire Stat-
ute was for the "design or neglect" of the carrier.
Finally, under both Fire Provisions, the courts permit the stat-
utes to be raised in both in personam actions and in rem actions
against the vessel. Some earlier case law had held that, because the
Fire Statute only refers to the owner having no liability under the
theory of vicarious liability, the statute allowed an in rem action
against the vessel. American admiralty tort law recognizes, gener-
ally, that the lack of an in personam remedy against an owner or
charterer of a vessel does not terminate in rem liability of the ves-
sel.49 Such a result would deny the owner a substantial portion of
the Fire Statute's protection. The Supreme Court has held, how-
ever, that if the Fire Provisions apply in a case to prevent the car-
rier from having in personam liability, the statute similarly will bar
in rem liability 50
Courts, therefore, have not limited the coverage of the Fire Pro-
visions by narrowly interpreting the beneficiary class. The courts
clearly eschewed the opportunity to limit the beneficiary class re-
garding foreign vessels and in rem actions. The important principle
derived from this observation is that the courts have not read limi-
tations or exceptions into the Fire Provisions that would reduce
the ambit of the benefit conferred under congressional policy
B. The Definition of "Fire"
Because the benefit of the Fire Provisions is limited to cargo
damage by fire, the second step of the judicial analysis is to deter-
mine whether a "fire" has occurred. This second threshold pro-
vides another opportunity to search for restrictive judicial inter-
pretation of the statutes.
48. 287 U.S. 420, 1933 A.M.C. 1 (1932).
49. See, e.g., The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464, 468 (1901); The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53
(1868); United States v. The Tug Parris Island, 215 F Supp. 144, 1963 A.M.C. 643
(E.D.N.C. 1963); GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 36, 599-600.
50. Consumers Import Co. v. Kawasaki Kabushiki Kaisha (The Venice Maru), 320 U.S.
249, 255-56, 1943 A.M.C. 1209, 1214 (1943).
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Courts traditionally have adopted the general dictionary defini-
tion of fire. The Oxford English Dictionary, for example, defines
the term as "the natural agency or active principle operative in
combustion: popularly conceived of as a substance visible in the
form of flame or of ruddy glow or incandescence." 1 In turn,
Black's Law Dictionary defines "fire" as:
The effect of combustion. The judicial meaning of the word does
not differ from the vernacular. The word 'fire' as used in isur-
ance policies does not have the technical meaning developed
from analysis of its nature, but more nearly the popular mean-
ing, being an effect rather than an elementary principle, and is
the effect of combustion, being equivalent to ignition or
burning. 2
Heat damage alone does not constitute fire. In The Buckeye
State,53 nearly 88,000 bushels of corn were damaged while m
transit. The only possible source of the damage was the electric
lights in the hold that were left on for some hours after the loading
and, possibly, for the entire voyage. The carrier asserted that fire
was the cause of the damage and claimed the benefit of the Fire
Statute. The court, m discussing the meaning of "fire" in the Fire
Statute, stated that, "fire is caused by ignition or combustion, and
it includes the idea of visible heat or light, and this is also the
popular meaning of the word."54 The carrier could prove neither
that a flame had damaged the corn nor that ash was present. Al-
though the corn had been damaged, even charred, by the extreme
heat in the hold, the heat never ignited the corn and therefore no
fire had occurred within the meaning of the Fire Statute.
In a similar case, Cargo Carriers, Inc. v. Brown,5 5 the court held
that heat rather than fire damaged a cargo of corn. A chemist testi-
fied that a fire is characterized by a flame or radiation of light.
Because there was no evidence of flame or radiated light, the court
found that the corn had been in a mere "distillation process" and
51. IV OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 238 (1961); see, e.g., Western Woolen Mill Co. v.
Northern Assurance Co., 139 F 637, 639 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 199 U.S. 608 (1905) (reflect-
ing judicial adoption of dictionary definition of "fire").
52. BLACK'S LAW DICTONARY 570 (5th Ed. 1979).
53. 39 F Supp. 344, 1941 A.M.C. 1238 (W.D.N.Y. 1941).
54. Id. at 347.
55. 95 F Supp. 288, 1950 A.M.C. 2046 (W.D.N.Y. 1950).
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held the Fire Statute inapplicable.
At first glance such distinctions appear unreasonable. Extreme
heat damages a cargo as completely as fire. Conversely, heat dam-
age, while potentially a grave risk, does not present the same dan-
ger as does fire. For example, generally the ship itself is not in sub-
stantial danger from heat, and one rationale for restricting carrier
liability for cargo damage under the Fire Provisions is that the car-
rier already will have suffered major loss due to damage or destruc-
tion of the ship by the fire .5  Additionally, the slow procession of
heat damage affords the carrier reasonable time to avoid damage
by inspection. The decisions in Buckeye and Cargo Carriers there-
fore rest on sound policy principles.
What if heat damage results, but then a fire breaks out? In
American Tobacco Co. v. Goulandris,5 7 high temperatures in the
cargo hold led to heat damage and subsequent fire. The cargo
owner contended that the carrier should be liable for the heat
damage suffered by the cargo before the outbreak of the actual fire.
The court reasoned that "spontaneous heat damage [to a cargo of
tobacco] prior to the actual fire is all part and parcel of one contin-
uous and uninterrupted process and is within the scope of the
Fire Statute, once actual fire exists. '58 The court applied the Fire
56. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
57. 173 F Supp. 140, 1959 A.M.C. 1462 (S.D.N.Y. 1959) aff'd, 281 F.2d 179, 1962 A.M.C.
2655 (2d Cir. 1960).
58. American Tobacco, 173 F Supp. at 178; see 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-5 to 14-
8 (discussing this problem). For a case in which the court accepted arguendo tht the master
of the vessel had been negilgent in the stowage of cargo, which led to heat damage and then,
fire, but held the damages were merged rather than depriving the shipowner of the protec-
tion of the COGSA Fire Provision, see American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadjipatera,
81 F Supp. 438, 1949 A.M.C. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), modified, 194 F.2d 449, 1951 A.M.C. 1933
(2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952). An explosion that may cause damage to
cargo similarly raises this interesting problem. The cases involving explosion and fire do not
appear to have distinguished the two events for purposes of applying the Fire Provisions.
See, e.g., Republic of France v. United States, 290 F.2d 395 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369
U.S. 804 (1962); Kokusai Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 33 F.2d 232
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 603 (1929). Recently, the Fifth Circuit held that where an
explosion is accompanied almost simultaneously by "an immense wall of fire" the Fire Pro-
visions apply. EAC Timberland v. Pisces Ltd., 580 F Supp. 99, 116 (D.P.R. 1983), aff'd, 745
F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1984). When a fire causes an explosion which does damage to cargo, then
certainly the Fire Provisions should apply. See Federazione Italiana Dei Corsorizi Aqrari v.
Mandask Compania de Vapsores, S.A., 388 F.2d 434, 436-38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.
828 (1968).
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Statute and imposed no personal negligence on the carrier.
In general, the approach of American Tobacco seems reasonable.
Because the owner normally could not distinguish heat damage
from fire damage in a case where heat damage preceded the fire, a
contrary approach would defeat the purpose of the Fire Statute in
limiting the owner's liability to personal negligence. Under the Su-
preme Court's decision in Schnell v. The Vallescura,59 the general
maritime rule is where damage to cargo is caused by two sources,
for one of which the carrier has no liability, the carrier bears the
often impossible burden of proving the extent of the damage
caused by the source for which the carrier has no liability Because
the Fire Statute removed vicarious liability as a basis for action, a
distinction between the negligence of the owner's servants and
agents regarding heat damage versus their negligence regarding fire
damage is inconsistent with that statute.
Because the fire and heat damage were substantially intertwined
in the American Tobacco case, the policy of the Fire Statute ap-
propriately was used to protect the owner. In American Tobacco,
neither the fire nor the heat damage resulted from the carrier's
negligence. A harder case is presented if the carrier is responsible
for some ascertainable amount of heat damage and a fire for which
he is not personally responsible subsequently destroys the remain-
ing cargo. Was the fire an independent intervening force that
breaks the chain of causation for the owner's negligent heat dam-
age? The independent intervening force argument is stronger if
most of the cargo is destroyed by the fire, but weakens if a signifi-
cant portion of the heat damaged cargo survives the fire.
What result if the cargo was damaged by heat through no fault
of the carrier, who then negligently started a fire that destroyed
the cargo? The Fire Statute analysis should not apply because the
carrier's personal negligence caused the fire. The rule of Schnell v.
The Vallescura would require the carrier to prove the reduced
value due to non-negligent heat damage or be liable for all dam-
age.60 Therefore, if the carrier could prove the value of the cargo at
the time of the fire, the carrier should be allowed to reduce his
59 293 U.S. 296, 1934 A.M.C. 1573 (1934).
60. See 2A BEN-DIcT, supra note 8, at 14-5 to 14-8 (discussing application of the rule of
Schnell v. The Vallescura).
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liability appropriately
Certainly, courts should not automatically merge heat damage
with fire damage. While recognizing that merger benefits the owner
that was not personally negligent, courts should consider general
Fire Statute policies in cases regarding personally negligent own-
ers. In those cases, if a carrier can reduce liability by distinguishing
heat from fire damage, the distinction benefits the carrier and pro-
motes the general goals of the Fire Statute.
C. The Location of the Fire
The Fire Provisions protect carriers from liability for fires that
damage cargo while it is on the ship. The fire does not have to
start on the ship. The fire might spread from a dock or another
ship and damage cargo on the defendant carrier's vessel. The car-
rier still would benefit from the Fire Provisions. In Anthony Gibbs
& Co. v. Munson S.S. Line (The Munares),6 1 cargo on a dock
caught fire. The court held that the Fire Statute protected only fire
damage to cargo on board the carrier's vessel. The court deter-
mined, however, that the public policy evidenced in the Fire Stat-
ute would allow a carrier to contract for fire relief so long as the
fire was not the result of the carrier's personal negligence. Al-
though the court was unable to determine the origin of the fire, the
court gave effect to a bill of lading provision that stated: "The Car-
rier shall not be liable for any loss occasioned by any of
the following Excepted Clauses: ., by fire or explosion from any
cause whatsoever occurring.' 62 The court held the contract consis-
tent with the Fire Statute policies so long as it did not protect a
carrier against his own negligence. As with the Fire Statute, to de-
feat a contract provision, the cargo owner would have to show the
cause of fire and carry the burden of proof as to personal negli-
gence of the carrier.
The court in The Munaries easily could have decided for the
cargo owner, maintaining that American maritime law prohibited
carriers from escaping their negligence by contract. Further, this
outcome could be supported by a literal reading of the Fire Stat-
ute's requirement that the fire begin on board. The refusal to rely
61. 12 F Supp. 913, 1936 A.M.C. 95 (E.D. La. 1935).
62. Id. at 917 (emphasis in original).
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on these theories suggests judicial attempts to implement congres-
sional intent behind the Fire Provisions, rather than efforts to re-
strict it.
D. Time of Application of the Fire Provision
The Fire Statute has no restriction as to time. The COGSA Fire
Provision, however, does. COGSA applies only to carriage of goods
covered by a bill of lading or similar document of title. Second,
COGSA applies only to carriage of goods in international trade to
or from United States ports.6 3 The COGSA Fire Provision, there-
fore, would not apply to a shipment of goods from Kingston, Ja-
maica, to Buenos Aries, Argentina. Further, in carriage of goods in
international trade to or from United States ports, COGSA applies
only from "tackle to tackle"-from the time the goods are loaded
aboard to the time they are discharged from the vessel that carried
them on the ocean voyage.6
In Remington Rand, Inc. v. American Export Lines, Inc.,66 a
ship carried some steel drums containing scrap movie film from
New York to Bombay, India. The carriage was under COGSA. The
drums were carried in an unventilated trunk hatch under high
temperatures, and then, upon arrival in Bombay, the carrier placed
them on the open deck for sixteen days with the drums exposed to
high temperatures. One day after the carrier off-loaded the drums
onto a lighter, time-chartered from a local owner in Bombay, the
drums spontaneously exploded and burned.6 The cargo owner
brought an action for fire damage and alleged negligent care of
cargo. The carrier sought protection from the COGSA ]ire Provi-
sion. The court held that COGSA and, thereby, the COGSA Fire
Provision, ceased to apply when the film was loaded on to the
lighter. COGSA Section 1301(e) provides that the term "carriage of
goods" covers the period from the tune the goods are loaded to the
time they are discharged from the "ship." "Ship" means the vessel
used for carriage of goods by sea under COGSA Section 1301(d),
and the sea voyage ended when the film was discharged onto the
63. 46 U.S.C. § 1300 (1982).
64. 46 U.S.C. § 1301(e) (1982).
65. 132 F Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
66. Id. at 132-36.
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lighter.
By the bill of lading, the carrier and the cargo owner had con-
tracted to have COGSA apply both from the time of the carrier's
receipt of the goods to the time of loading, and from time of dis-
charge to time of delivery to the consignee. Because the Harter Act
automatically applied in that period, however, the COGSA provi-
sions could not be extended to have controlling statutory effect by
private contract.6 The inapplicability of COGSA while the Harter
Act applied is also supported by the fact that the Harter Act
would not relieve the carrier of vicarious liability while the Fire
Provision would have done so. A decision to allow COGSA protec-
tion by contract would interfere substantially with the Harter Act
scheme.
The carrier also sought protection from the Fire Statute. The
Fire Statute applies only to the owner or bareboat charterer of a
vessel on which the cargo suffers fire damage. 8 Because the carrier
in this case was a time charterer of the lighter where the fire dam-
age occurred, the carrier could not qualify for protection under the
Fire Statute.
IV THE HEART OF THE FIRE PROVISIONS-THE REQUIREMENT OF
PERSONAL NEGLIGENCE OF THE CARRIER
Under the Fire Statute, the carrier incurs no liability to a cargo
owner for fire damage to cargo unless the carrier's own negligence
caused the fire. 9 The Fire Statute eliminates vicarious liability for
the negligent acts of servants or agents, including unseaworthiness
of the vessel caused by a lack of due diligence by employees or
independent contractors. By treating "privity or knowledge" in the
Limitation Act and "design or neglect" in the Fire Statute as sy-
nonymous, Gilmore and Black would have the benefit of the Fire
Provisions, along with that of the Limitation Act, conditioned on
the carrier or shipowner having to show due diligence as to seawor-
thmess, if the cargo owner proves an unseaworthy condition caused
67. Id. at 138.
68. See supra note 15.
69. Earle & Stoddart, 287 U.S. at 424-25; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. MN Leslie Lykes,
734 F.2d 199, 207 (5th Cir. 1984); Alfa Romeo, Inc. v. S.S. Tormita, 499 F Supp. 1272, 1282
(S.D.N.Y. 1980), aff'd, 659 F.2d 1057 (2d Cir. 1981).
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fire damage to cargo.70 The Supreme Court, in the leading case of
Earle & Stoddart v. Ellerman's Wilson Line,71 explicitly rejected
the theory that the duty as to seaworthiness should take prece-
dence over the statutory protection of the Fire Provisions. If un-
seaworthiness of the vessel caused the fire which damaged cargo,
only the carrier's personal lack of due diligence as to that unsea-
worthiness would result in carrier liability.
Unseaworthiness is not an absolute, but rather a relative term.72
Seaworthiness must be considered in relation to the particular voy-
age, crew, cargo, and stowage.73 The Supreme Court has defined
unseaworthiness as failure of a vessel to be "so tight, staunch, and
strong, as to be competent to resist all ordinary action of the sea
and to prosecute and complete the voyage without damage to the
cargo. 17 4 However, "the standard of seaworthiness, like so many
other legal standards, must always be uncertain, for the law cannot
fix in advance those precautions in hull and gear which will be nec-
essary to meet the manifold dangers of the sea."'75 Most bills of
lading, as well as COGSA, reduce the warranty of absolute seawor-
thiness, which is implied under general admiralty law, to an obliga-
tion to exercise due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy 76 Due
diligence, in turn, is that degree of care to be expected of a reason-
ably prudent shipowner.7
Under the principle of nondelegable duty, the negligence stan-
dard applies vicariously to all of the carrier's employees or inde-
pendent contractors hired by the carrier,78 and the duty cannot be
delegated regardless of the reputation or expertise of the delegee.79
"Due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy must in fact have
been exercised. It is not sufficient for a shipowner to show that he
70. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 879, 886.
71. 287 U.S. 420, 1933 A.M.C. 1 (1932).
72. See 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at § 7-2.
73. Id; see The Southwark, 191 U.S. 1 (1903). For emphasis on the specific circumstances,
see The Sagamore, 300 F 701, 1924 A.M.C. 961 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 266 U.S. 612 (1924).
See also Benedict, supra note 8, ch. VIII.
74. Dupont v. Vance, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 162, 167 (1856).
75. Id.
76. See 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 8-1.
77. Id. at 8-2; The Southwark, 191 U.S. at 15-16.
78. See 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 8-3.
79. Id. at 8-3 to 8-5.
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employed competent men to do the work, but he is held responsi-
ble for the failure of the men he employed."80 Normally, the carrier
owes the duty of due diligence as to seaworthiness only until the
carrying vessel commences its voyage carrying that cargo owner's
shipment. Once the voyage has begun, subsequent unseaworthiness
that is due to lack of due diligence and that causes damage to that
cargo will not give rise to carrier's liability, at least not for viola-
tion of the duty of due diligence as to seaworthiness.
After passage of the Fire Statute, Congress enacted the Harter
Act81 in 1893, requiring carriers to exercise due diligence in provid-
ing a seaworthy carrying vessel. Carriers could not avoid that duty
by contract. Faced with inconsistency between the Harter Act and
the Fire Statute, the United States Supreme Court in Earle &
Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line 2, unanimously rejected
any dominance of the Harter Act. In Earle & Stoddart, the steam-
ship Galileo, after bunkering in New York, departed with a full
cargo. Shortly thereafter, the crew discovered that the coal in a
temporary bunker had caught fire through spontaneous combus-
tion due to negligent loading. The crew unsuccessfully fought the
fire and the Galileo sank, with virtually total loss of cargo. The fire
caused the loss, and the condition of the coal, when the voyage
commenced, caused the fire. This was a condition of unseaworthi-
ness caused by the gross negligence of the Galileo's chief engineer
in putting a new supply of coal on top of coal known to be
heated.8 3 This condition of unseaworthmess was avoidable by "due
diligence" before the voyage, within the meaning of that term
under the Harter Act.
The cargo owners explicitly posed the issue of dominance of the
duty of due diligence as to seaworthiness over the Fire Statute:
[T]he cargo owners concede that ordinarily the phrase in the fire
statute 'neglect of such owner' means personal negligence of the
owner, or, in case of a corporate owner, negligence of its manag-
ing officers or agents; and that the negligence of the master,
chief engineer or other ship's officers does not deprive the owner
80. The Leerdan, 17 F.2d 586, 587, 1927 A.M.C. 509, 510 (5th Cir. 1927).
81. For the current version, see 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1982).
82. 287 U.S. 420, 1933 A.M.C. 1 (1932).
83. Id. at 424-25.
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of the statutory immunity The contention is that the stat-
ute does not confer immunity where the fire resulted from un-
seaworthiness existing at the commencement of the voyage and
discoverable by the exercise of ordinary care;
The Supreme Court held that owner neglect, in relation to the
Fire Statute, and lack of due diligence for seaworthiness are differ-
ent terms. A "failure to exercise due diligence" indeed may arise
from negligence directly attributable to the carrier, but also may
arise from imputation to the owner of the negligence of employee
or independent contractors. Thus, a failure to exercise due dili-
gence does not equate to direct owner neglect under the Fire Stat-
ute. The Supreme Court refused to grant dominance to the duty of
due diligence as to seaworthiness. First, the court pointed out that
other than the one exception for the shipowner's "design or neg-
lect," "the statute makes no other exception from the complete im-
munity granted. '8 5 The Supreme Court refused to read into the
Fire Statute an exception that Congress had not placed there. Sec-
ond, in response to the argument of primacy of the duty of due
diligence in the Harter Act, the Supreme Court pointed out that
the Harter Act expressly stated that nothing in the Act was in-
tended to "modify or repeal" the Fire Statute.8 6 The Supreme
Court then noted that, "in all the cases when immunity from lia-
bility for damage by fire was held to be lost," the finding of neglect
of the owner was based "on the action of the owner or managing
agent. 81 7 Furthermore, "[t]he courts have been careful not to
thwart the purpose of the Fire Statute by interpreting as 'neglect'
of the owners the breach of what in other connections is held to be
a non-delegable duty "88
Earle & Stoddart effectively settled the issue of conflict of due
diligence for seaworthiness with the Fire Statute, 89 and the cases
84. Id.
85. Id. at 425.
86. Id. at 427; see also 46 U.S.C. § 196 (1982).
87. Id. at 427 n.3.
88. Id. at 427-28.
89. See, e.g., Hoskyn & Co., Inc. v. Silver Line, Ltd. (The Silver Cypress), 143 F.2d 462,
465, 1944 A.M.C. 895, 896 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 767 (1944); Globe & Rutgers Fire
Ins. Co. v. United States (The Zaca), 105 F.2d 160, 167 1939 A.M.C. 912, 920 (2d Cir.), cert
denied 308 U.S. 611 (1939).
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following the enactment of COGSA, with its Fire Provision, trans-
ferred the reasoning of Earle & Stoddart to the new legislation. In
a COGSA Fire Provision case, A/S Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v.
Accinanto (The Ocean Liberty),90 the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Second Circuit stated that the "exemption of the fire
statute is admittedly the same as that provided by the carriage of
Goods at Sea Act" and then reiterated the rule of Earle &
Stoddart:
We do not think that the carrier can be held liable on the theory
that the stowage of cargo was a non-delegable duty negligence in
performance of which should be imputed to the carrier in deter-
mining whether it had exercised due care to make the vessel
seaworthy."1
In another COGSA Fire Provision case, Petition of Skibs A/S Jo-
land (The Black Gull),92 the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found evidence of unseaworthiness and re-
manded the case to the district court, but also stated that, "of
course to charge [the carrier] with negligence sufficient to establish
liability, it must appear that the negligence was within 'actual fault
or privity of the carrier.'-"3
Concurrently, the courts in cases not involving the seaworthiness
issue continued to maintain the general principle that, regardless
of context, a carrier could not be vicariously liable under the Fire
Provisions. In American Tobacco Co. v. The Katingo Hadji-
patera,4 the ship, loaded with tobacco, was forced to detour
around Africa, due to the outbreak of World War II. The long, hot
voyage led to damage, including a spontaneous fire. Because the
defendants were voyage charterers, the case involved only the
COGSA Fire Provision. The court, however, viewed the two statu-
tory provisions as having the same meaning and applied Fire Stat-
ute case law. In interpreting the COGSA Fire Provision, the court
held that:
90. 199 F.2d 134, 1952 A.M.C. 1681 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992 (1953).
91. Id. at 143.
92. 250 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1957).
93. Id. at 784. The court did not even use the term "due diligence as to seaworthiness."
94. 81 F Supp. 438, 1949 A.M.C. 49 (S.D.N.Y. 1948), modified, 194 F.2d 449, 1951 A.M.C.
1933 (2d Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 978 (1952).
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Under both the Fire Statute and the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act the shipowner and carrier are not liable for fire damage, un-
less caused by the owner's design or neglect or carrier's
fault of privity That the master may have been personally
at faulty in [respect to loading] does not impose liability on the
shipowners, for his neglect is not their neglect within the Fire
Statute. 5
The strong policy of statutory construction also announced in
Earle & Stoddart advising that the courts should not condition the
benefit of the Fire Statute (and by extension, the COGSA Fire
Provision) on compliance with other statutory provisions likewise
continues to receive support. In Automobile Insurance Co. v.
United Fruit Co. (The Shell Bar),98 the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit refused to apply the "statutory
fault" rule to aid the cargo owner in establishing the cause of the
fire by use of a presumption of causation. The court was adamant
in its condemnation of any judicial effort to erode the protection of
the Fire Provision:
The immunity from liability for fire loss under the Fire Statute
is not conditioned upon compliance with other statutes
There are no exceptions other than those expressed in the stat-
ute itself We are not justified to engraft on the Fire
Statute the conditions of compliance with requirements found
elsewhere, whether by statute or regulation . Since 1851
there has been no indication of congressional intent to relieve
cargo interests The exemption provided by [COGSA] was
the same as that provided by the Fire Statute.9 7
On the strength of Earle & Stoddart, American courts for over
forty years did not question seriously the rule that the Fire Provi-
sions did not presuppose due diligence for seaworthiness. In 1959,
international unanimity was disrupted when the British Privy
Council decided Maxine Footwear Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Govern-
ment Merchant Marine, Ltd. (The Maunenne).9 8 In Maxine Foot-
wear, ice blocked three scupper pipes on board the ship which was
95. Id. at 445-46.
96. 224 F.2d 72 (2d Cir.), cert. dened, 350 U.S. 885 (1955).
97. Id. at 75.
98. 1959 A.C. 589, [1959] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 105.
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loading cargo. The master instructed one of the ship's officers to
thaw out the pipes and that officer hired an independent contrac-
tor to use an acetylene torch to melt the ice. The scupper pipes,
however, had cork insulation which caught fire and spread unde-
tected throughout the inside of the ship's pipes. The master was
forced to scuttle the ship and cargo was lost. In Maxine Footwear,
the fire itself was the unseaworthy condition, because the cargo
was loaded after the fire started, but before it was discovered. The
trial court found the ship's officer to be negligent.9 9 Under the Ca-
nadian COGSA Fire Provision, similiar to ours, the carrier was lia-
ble only for his own negligence in causing a fire. Because the ship's
officer was not a managing agent (and certainly the independent
contractor torch operator was not), his negligence would not be im-
puted to the carrier.
The British Privy Council overruled the Canadian trial court,
holding that the due diligence as to seaworthiness provision of the
Canadian Carriage of Goods Act was controlling as to the Act's
Fire Provision. The Privy Council based its opinion primarily on
the view that the Canadian COGSA balanced the interests of car-
rier and cargo and chose to demand due diligence as to seaworthi-
ness in any conflict with the Fire Provisions. Further, the Cana-
dian COGSA has introductory language to its provision on the
duty of care of cargo that correctly suggests that duty is subject to
the listed exceptions from liability, including the COGSA Fire Pro-
vision. The due diligence as to seaworthiness provision, however,
does not contain such language. The Privy Council took this dis-
tinction as a statutory message of the primacy of the seaworthiness
provision. As a result of Maxine Footwear, if a carrier's servant or
other agent in Canada causes the carrying vessel to be unseaworthy
due to lack of due diligence, and if that unseaworthy condition
causes a fire, the carrier will be vicariously liable for that conduct.
If the fire occurs in any other way, such as negligent care of cargo,
the Fire Provision would operate as in the past.
The Privy Council's decision in Maxine Footwear contradicts
the decision in the Earle & Stoddart case, long accepted as the
rule for our COGSA Fire Provision. The American COGSA and the
Canadian COGSA contain the same provisions on seaworthiness
99. Id. at 601, 2 Lloyd's List L.R. at 112.
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and fire; the two COGSA's were enacted in the same year and they
both closely track the language of the "Hague Rules" of 1924, the
provisions of which are embodied m the International Convention
for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Bills of Lading.00
The United States signed that Convention m 1925 and ratified it
m 1937, but only after enacting COGSA, with few changes, as na-
tional legislation.10 1
This 1959 holding on Canadian law, however, should not be a
persuasive authority to suggest a ground for judicial reversal of the
American rule.10 2 American law contains one factor not present in
the Canadian situation; we have the Fire statute, which preceded
enactment of the United States COGSA by eighty-five years. Our
statute established specific and early congressional policy concern-
ing negligent fire damage in carriage of cargo relations. At the time
of the enactment of the Harter Act,103 that Act specifically stated
that the Harter Act was not meant to modify or repeal the Fire
Statute.04 Our Supreme Court, in Earle & Stoddart, rendered a
definitive decision opposing any primacy or dominance of the Har-
ter Act, not because the Fire Statute stood outside the Harter Act,
but rather because Congress had made clear that the Harter Act
was not to affect the Fire Statute. The United States COGSA 0 5
Fire Provision expressly states that the Act "shall not affect the
rights and obligations of the carrier under [the Fire Statute]." ''o
Indeed, because in international maritime carriage, COGSA with
its Fire Provision applies only "tackle to tackle," COGSA does not
apply from receipt in carrier custody to loading on the carrying
vessel for the international voyage or from discharge for carrying
100. 51 Stat 233, T.S. No. 931, 120 L.N.T.S. 155.
101. See 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 2-9, 2-10; GILMoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 143-
44; A. KNAUTH, THE AMERICAN LAW OF OCEAN BiLLs oF LADING 125-31 (4th ed. 1953).
102. The Ninth Circuit found the Maxine Footwear case "highly persuasive" in their de-
cision to move to a "half-way house" by requiring carriers, in cases of fire damage to cargo
resulting from alleged lack of due diligence to seaworthiness, to bear the burden of proof
that there was no personal lack of due diligence by the carrier. Sunkist Growers, Inc. v.
Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327, 1979 A.M.C. 2787 (9th Cir. 1979).
103. 46 U.S.C. §§ 190-196 (1982).
104. 46 U.S.C. § 196 (1982).
105. 46 U.S.C. §§ 1300-1315 (1982).
106. 46 U.S.C. § 1308 (1982).
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vessel to delivery to consignee. 10 7 The Fire Statute applies exclu-
sively either to lighterage or other vessel carriage m those periods
or to coastal and interstate cargo carriage. Congress could not have
intended the same result for our COGSA Fire Provision as the
Maxine Footwear decision achieved for the Canadian Fire Provi-
sion-or indeed, any significant change in the application of the
COGSA Fire Provision-while choosing expressly to have the Fire
Statute remain unaffected by such a major change. For nearly fifty
years, courts have repeated that the two United States Fire Provi-
sions have the same meaning. 08 Finally, the Fire Statute has or-
dered carriage of cargo relations regarding negligent fire damage
for over one hundred and thirty years; the COGSA Fire Provision
has functioned for nearly fifty years, both without apparent diffi-
culties or efforts to modify their operation.
A. The Second Heresy: Confusion of the Doctrine of Unseaworthi-
ness With the Fire Provisions
In 1973, in Asbestos Corp. Ltd. v. Compagnie de Navigation
Fraissinet et Cyprian Fabre (The Marquette),09 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, although agreeing with
precedent, introduced substantial terminology from the unseawor-
thiness doctrine into the Fire Provision analysis. As a result, the
opinion invites confusion. The holding in Asbestos Corp. is not es-
pecially novel. The district court found no personal negligence of
the carrier for causing the fire. The district court did find, how-
ever, personal neglect by the owner in failing to provide adequate
firefighting equipment.
The district court in Asbestos Corp. followed the normal legal
analysis of the Fire Provisions. The district court pointed out that
the "design or neglect" must be personal to the shipowner, and
that negligence of the master, crew, or agents is not imputed to the
owner." 0 Citing the Earle & Stoddert case, the district court rec-
ognized that even for lack of due diligence as to seaworthiness, the
107. See, e.g., Remington Rand, Inc. v. American Export Lines, Inc., 132 F Supp. 129
(S.D.N.Y. 1955) (discussed supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text).
108. See supra note 19; notes 90-97 and accompanying text.
109. 480 F.2d 669, 1973 A.M.C. 1683 (2d Cir. 1973).
110. Asbestos Corp., 345 F. Supp. at 820.
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Fire Provisions require conduct directly attributable to the carrier.
The court noted the rule that the burden to establish "design or
neglect" or "actual fault or privity" of the carrier is on the cargo
owner. The court then discussed case authority showing clearly
that the court was finding neglect of the carrier and not of its ser-
vants.'11 Whenever the district court used the terminology of sea-
worthiness and due diligence in the process of correctly applying
the law of the Fire Provisions, the court was careful to emphasize
that it was considering the carrier's conduct rather than the con-
duct of the officer and crew.
The structure of the Second Circuit decision in Asbestos Corp. is
somewhat confusing. Instead of starting with a discussion of the
Fire Provisions, as did the district court, and keeping discussion of
seaworthiness terminology in the context of the Fire Provisions,
the appellate court split the two topics. The Second Circuit first
considered the district court findings on unseaworthiness due to
personal lack of due diligence by the carrier and upheld those find-
ings. The Second Circuit then discussed the analysis under the
Fire Provisions and used the correct approach, deciding that even
if the carrier was not negligent in causing the fire, the carrier still
would be liable for damage caused by his own negligence in not
providing the proper equipment and ability to use the equipment
to extinguish the fire. The circuit court, however, carried over its
earlier conclusions on lack of due diligence regarding seaworthiness
and inserted that terminology in the Fire Provision analysis. The
court did not emphasize, however, that its decision relied on a lack
of due diligence directly attributable to the carrier rather than on
vicarious liability for conduct of the carrier's servants. Thus, the
opinion contains such potentially misleading statements as: "[The
trial judge] held that an inexcusable condition of unseaworthmess
of a vessel, which in fact causes the damage-either by starting a
fire, or by preventing its extinguishment-will exclude the ship-
owner from the exemption of the Fire Statute and COGSA. We
agree."'1 2
Near the end of its opinion, the appellate court did state, m the
text and in a footnote, such basic propositions under the Fire Pro-
111. Id. at 821-22 (discussing The Virginia, 264 F 986, 996 (D.C. Md. 1920)).
112. Asbestos Corp., 480 F.2d at 672 (emphasis in original).
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visions as the requirement of personal negligence of the carrier,
and that the burden of proof as to negligence of the carrier is on
the cargo owner. In Asbestos Corp., the second circuit committed
the second heresy by confusing the distinct doctrine of unseawor-
thmess with the Fire Provisions. Although the confusion did not
operate in the actual application of the Fire Provisions, the confu-
sion in the language of the appellate court's opinion is misleading
and improper for two reasons. First, the confusion of unseaworthi-
ness with the Fire Provisions was inconsistent with over 130 years
of American law. Second, if the decision was influenced by Maxine
Footwear, the differences between the American and Canadian
contexts of law and history prevent this application of the law of
the Canadian COGSA to our COGSA. The Maxine Footwear pre-
cedent is, therefore, inapplicable to American maritime law.
B. The Third Heresy: American Reliance on Maxine Footwear
In 1979, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit committed rank heresy in deciding Sunkist Growers, Inc. v.
Adelaide Shipping Lines.113 In Sunkist, a fire broke out in the en-
gine room of a general cargo vessel carrying over 58,000 crates of
fresh lemons. A low pressure fuel line parted, spraying fuel on the
hot surfaces of two generators. What followed, in the court's words,
"might well be described as a shakespearean comedy of errors,
with a result akin to one of his tragedies.""' 4 The engineers, re-
sponding to the fire alarm, understood neither the ship's equip-
ment nor its firefighting procedures. In the resulting chaos, the
chief engineer was killed, the ship burned for three days, the
master died of a heart attack, and the entire shipment of lemons
was lost.115
The Ninth Circuit, in reversing the district court on its finding
of fact, held that the uncorrected use of an improper fitting in the
fuel line and the failure to provide a crew competent in firefighting
procedures, violated the duties of the carrier's managing agents
and, therefore, was an act of neglect directly attributable to the
113. 603 F.2d 1327, 1979 A.M.C. 2787 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
114. Id. at 1329.
115. Id. at 1330.
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carrier.11 The Ninth Circuit began by stating the rule that the car-
rier is liable only for its own negligent conduct in fire damage to
cargo. The decision broke with precedent on the issue of the locus
of the burden of proof when unseaworthiness of the vessel is al-
leged by the cargo owner as the cause of the fire. Specifically, the
court maintained that:
We adopt, as the law of our Circuit, the construction placed in
the Hague Rules by their Lordships in [The Maurienne, the Ca-
nadian Maxine Footwear case], and hold that the provisions of
Section 3, Paragraph 1, COGSA [section 1303(1)], create an
overriding obligation and if that obligation is not fulfilled and
the nonfulfillment causes the damage, the fire immunity of Sec-
tion 4, Paragraph 2(b) [section 1304(2)(b), the COGSA Fire Pro-
vision], cannot be relied upon by appellee. The overriding obli-
gation to exercise due diligence [as to seaworthiness] applies to
the master and those in the management of the ship, as well as
to the owners or charterers personally, or those who act for the
owners in a managerial capacity.
Our analysis of the record convinces us that the appellee also
failed to carry their burden of proof on the issue of exercising
due diligence to make the ship seaworthy as required by [section
1304(1)].117
Such ambiguous language might mean either that the duty of
due diligence as to seaworthiness always takes precedence in cargo
fire damage cases or that, although the carrier has the burden of
proof to show due diligence, it only has to prove personal due dili-
gence. The Sunkist decision relied on the rule of the Canadian
case of Maxine Footwear,118 which had held that in a fire damage
case, where the fire is caused by a lack of personal or vicarious due
diligence as to seaworthiness, the due diligence duty is "an overrid-
ing obligation." In Maxine Footwear, the ship's officer failed to be
diligent. The court found that the officer was not a "managing
agent" of the carrier. Indeed, the court, in applying the unseawor-
thiness doctrine, stated that the carrier would have had a "very
116. Id. at 1334-35.
117. Id at 1341.
118. 1959 A.C. 589, [1959] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 105. Gilmore and Black advocate the As-
bestos and Maxine Footwear approach. See GJLMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 161.
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strong case" under the Canadian COGSA Provision. 119 Thus, Max-
ine Footwear does more than shift the burden of proof as to the
personal negligence of the carrier. The express rule of that case is
that the duty of due diligence as to seaworthiness is preeminent. If
personal or vicarious lack of diligence results in unseaworthiness
leading to a fire, the carrier loses any protection he otherwise
would have had under the COGSA Fire Provision. If the cargo
owner demonstrates that unseaworthiness existed and caused the
fire, the carrier then has the burden under the Canadian COGSA
to prove that it exercised due diligence, including the due diligence
of its servants or agents.
The Ninth Circuit in Sunkist, however, concentrated on the per-
sonal diligence of the carrier without distinguishing between liabil-
ity for the carrier's own conduct and vicarious liability for conduct
of such servants as the master, ship's officer, and crew. For exam-
ple, the opinion rejected the district court's finding of no personal
negligence: "[H]ere the design or neglect was that of managing of-
ficers or supervisory employees, not that of the master or crew or
subordinate employees.' 120 A later Ninth Circuit case also supports
the view that Sunkist requires the carrier to assume the burden of
proof regarding due diligence under COGSA Section 1304(1) only
to the extent of proving no personal lack of due diligence. In the
case of Hasbro Industries, Inc. v. MIS St. Constantine,12' the ship-
per contended that time charterers of the ship were vicariously lia-
ble for fire damage caused by unseaworthiness due to the lack of
due diligence by the shipowner. The Ninth Circuit stated that,
"since liability for loss by fire may be imposed only where there is
'actual fault' [citing the COGSA Fire Provision], a breach is neces-
sarily personal to the 'carrier' that is responsible for the harm."'122
The court went on to say that Sunkist recognized in fire damage
cases that liability is based on the carrier's personal, not vicarious,
lack of due diligence: "[T]he Sunkist case deals primarily with the
allocation of the burden of proof in COGSA cases, and with the
trial court's error on shifting the burden to the cargo claimants
119. Id. at 602, [1959] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. at 107.
120. 603 F.2d at 1336.
121. 705 F.2d 339 (9th Cir.) cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 537 (1983).
122. Id. at 342.
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once the carrier had made an initial showing. '123 The Ninth Cir-
cuit in Hasbro concurred with the district court opinion in that
case that the time charterers had "sustained their burden of
proof.1 24
Thus, Sunkist followed the rule that even in the case of unsea-
worthiness due to lack of due diligence causing fire damage to
cargo, the carrier is liable only for negligent conduct directly at-
tributable to it through conduct of its managerial level personnel.
At least for the COGSA Fire Provision, some of the arguments ad-
vanced by the Sunkist decision might equally extend to a conten-
tion that the carrier should be vicariously liable for unseaworthi-
ness due to lack of due diligence by servants or agents under the
concept of nondelegable duty
Despite the heresies not only of confusing the unseaworthiness
doctrine with the Fire Provisions, but also, of relying on the Max-
me Footwear reasoning, the current trend of judicial decisions con-
tinues to be that the Fire Provisions have eliminated vicarious re-
sponsibility as a ground for liability of carriers in cases of fire
damage to cargo. Regardless of the duty involved, only the carrier's
own conduct, which for the corporate carrier is the conduct of its
managing officer or higher level supervisory personnel, will consti-
tute "design or neglect" or "actual fault or privity" of the carrier
under the Fire Provisions. The duty of due diligence as to seawor-
thiness does not outweigh the Fire Provisions. Even in the Ninth
Circuit, with its recent Sunkist and Hasbro decisions placing the
burden of proof as to lack of personal due diligence on the carrier,
the basic rule that only lack of personal due diligence will give rise
to liability still continues. This trend of legal decisions and the
general absence of negative judicial commentary on this require-
ment of the Fire Provisions, suggest the continued support of the
courts to give effect to the congressional policy expressed in the
Fire Provisions.
V BALANCING POWER BETWEEN CARRIER AND CARGO: THE BURDEN
OF PROOF UNDER THE FIRE PROVISIONS
Under the traditional, majority rule, the burdens of proof under
123. Id.
124. Id.
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the Fire Provisions are as follows:
1. The cargo owner must establish a prima facie case for recov-
ery 125 To do that the cargo owner must show receipt of cargo by
carrier in undamaged condition and failure of carrier to deliver the
cargo m undamaged condition. Such proof usually presents little
difficulty
2. The carrier then must establish that fire caused the damage
to cargo.126 Although often easy, in cases of total destruction of the
ship by sudden explosion or disappearance without report, this
may be an impossible hurdle. 12 7 Also, cases arise in which heat
damage occurs, but the carrier cannot prove that fire also
occurred.1 28
3. The cargo owner then must prove the entire cause of action
against the carrier based on a showing that the cause of the fire
that damaged the cargo was the personal negligent conduct of the
carrier (for a corporate carrier, conduct by a managing agent of
sufficient authority). The cargo owner then must show a sufficient
nexus between the negligent conduct and the specific event causing
the fire to say that the carrier's negligence caused the fire, i.e., the
"design or neglect" or "actual fault or privity" of the carrier.1 29
Any one of these elements may be quite difficult for the shipper.
Until recently, the prevailing case law has made the cargo owner
125. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. MNV Leslie Lykes, 734 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1984);
Terman Foods, Inc. v. Omega Lines, 707 F.2d 1225, 1227 (l1th Cir. 1983).
126. 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-3; Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. MN Leslie Lykes,
734 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1984).
127. See, e.g., In re Marine Sulphur Queen, 460 F.2d 89, 19 A.M.C. 1122 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 982 (1982). The court presumed unseaworthiness from an unexplained
loss of a vessel which recently had departed from port. The carrier would have no proof if a
fire had occurred. An inexplicable loss of vessel, therefore, may result in both loss of use of
Fire Provisions, and a basis of presumption for liability.
128. 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-3; supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
129. 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-9 to 14-28; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 896;
Thede, supra note 6, at 985. Connell Bros. v. Sevenseas Trading & S.S. Co., S.A. (The Sa-
lina Cruz), 111 F Supp. 227, 1953 A.M.C. 837 (N.D. Cal. 1953), rev'd, 220 F.2d 511 (4th Cir.
1955), and The Edmund Fanning, 105 F Supp. 353 (S.D.N.Y. 1952), state specific elements
of proof the cargo owner must prove. See also Comment, The Elements of Burden of Proof
Under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 289, 297-98 (1973);
Comment, The Allocation of the Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases, 50 U. OF
CH. L. REv. 1146 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Burden of Proof in Marine Fire
Damage Cases].
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shoulder the burden of proof in each instance 30 One commentator
has traced the rule back to the early case of Keene v. The Whis-
tler'31 and its language that "[t]he burden of proof is on the libel-
lant to show that such fire was caused by the design or neglect of
the owner of the vessel."'' 3 2 Gilmore and Black, again improperly
viewing the Fire Provisions in the context of the Limitation Act,' s
maintain that in the "privity and knowledge" cases under section
183 of the Act, wherein the shipowner seeks to qualify for linita-
tion of liability, two problems are involved:
first, the establishment of liability to shipowner to the claim-
ant, as to which the claimant (or libellant) bears the burden;
second, the burden of establishing privity or knowledge or their
absence. It seems reasonable that the shipowner who invokes the
Limitation Act, should bear the burden of proving the absence
of privity or knowledge: as to that branch of the case he is the
moving party and the facts are peculiarly within his knowledge
this allocation has been universally accepted.
There is no reason why the allocation of the burden of proof
should be different in Fire Statute cases from the universally
accepted allocation in Lumitation Act cases."3
The Limitation Act thus provides a two-step analysis. To estab-
lish basic liability, including vicarious liability, the claimant (e.g., a
130. See, e.g., 2A BENEDcr, supra note 8, at 14-9.
131. 14 F Cas. 208 (D.C.D. Cal. 1873) (No. 7,645). See Thede, supra note 6, at 985 n.178
(citing Keene and discussing cases supporting the rule that cargo owner bears the burden
for all elements of action for personal negligence of carrier); see GmMORE & BLACK, supra
note 7, at 896 (critizing the rule). Recent cases following the rule include Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. MN Leslie Lykes, 734 F.2d 199, 206 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Ta Ci Navigation
(Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1982); Asbestos Corp. v. Compagme de Naviga-
tion Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 480 F.2d, 669, 672-73, 1973 A.M.C. 1683, 1687 (2d Cir.
1973). Contra Hasbro Industries v. M/S St. Constantine, 705 F.2d 339, 341, 1980 A.M.C.
1425, 1442 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 537 (1983)(burden of proof as to personal
negligence shifts to carrier if cargo owner proves that unseaworthmess caused the fire); Sun-
lust Grower's Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd., 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980); see also Comment, Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage
Cases, supra note 129 (extensively researches the historical background and the case law on
this burden of proof).
132. 14 F at 208.
133. See supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text; Comment, Burden of Proof in Marine
Fire Damage Cases, supra note 129, at 1146, 1156-57, 1162-63 (showing the influence of
Gilmore and Black's focus on this question).
134. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 895-96 (emphasis added).
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cargo owner) must show a good cause of action in law. The claim-
ant, therefore, bears the initial burden of proof. Once liability is
established, the Limitation Act provides an opportunity for the
shipowner to limit that liability by proving no personal fault or no
wrongful conduct directly attributable to the shipowner. Because
the shipowner is the party seeking relief under the Act from estab-
lished liability, the shipowner has the burden of proof.
Under the Fire Provisions, however, Congress eliminated vicari-
ous liability as a ground for liability of the carrier for fire damage
to cargo. To establish liability of the carrier, a cargo owner in a
case concerning fire damage to cargo must show personal negli-
gence on the part of the carrier. Because a carrier has no estab-
lished liability from which to escape, the relief granted by Congress
to carriers in fire damage cases is more profound than that granted
under the Limitation Act. Either the carrier has no liability, or it
does because of personal negligence, and the Fire Provisions do not
purport to limit liability in the latter case. The statutory relief of
the Fire Provisions, however, is limited to fire risk, to property
damage, and to the carrier-cargo owner relationship.
Because Gilmore and Black's discussion of the Fire Provisions is
intertwined with the law and policy of the Limitation Act,'3 5 they
state that the many cases opposing their view require the cargo
claimants "not only to prove negligence or fault but also to prove
that the fire was, in the words of the Fire Statute, 'caused by the
design or neglect of such owner.' ,,u Such close identification of
the Fire Statute with the Limitation Act obscures the fact that,
under the Fire Statute, until the cargo owner proves personal neg-
ligence of the carrier, the cargo owner has proved no negligence or
fault chargeable to the carrier. In effect, what Gilmore and Black
seek is amendment of the Fire Provisions, not a balanced applica-
tion of congressional policy evidenced by the statutes.
What is the significance of the burden of proof in these cases? In
those instances where the cargo owner has sufficient evidence of a
carrier's personal negligence, the burden of proof means little. The
cargo owner establishes its case anyway. For the cargo owner to
135. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-189 (1982); see supra notes 36-41 and accompanying text (criticiz-
ing this structure of analysis); GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 877-98.
136. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 896 (emphasis added).
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win in any other situation, however, one of two events has to occur.
Either the cargo owner will establish a valid claim on the basis of
vicarious liability or the cargo owner will attempt to take advan-
tage of a presumption of negligent conduct by the carrier or the
carrier's servants or agents. In passing the Fire Statute, however,
Congress clearly did not want vicarious liability to continue to op-
erate and surely Congress did not enact the carrier-protective Fire
Statute in order to grant cargo owners a presumption of carrier
negligence. Even if the decisions have not clearly enunciated the
fact, courts for over one hundred years have responded to the in-
ternal logic of Congress' policy objectives by restricting the cargo
owner's basis of action against the carrier in cases of fire damage.
Contentions that the carrier should bear the general burden of
proof in showing an absence of personal neglect have received vir-
tually no acceptance by the courts. In Verbeeck v. Black Diamond
Steamship Corp.,'37 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit adopted the position of Gilmore and Black almost
verbatim, including their confusion with the Limitation Act. 38 The
court cited Gilmore and Black and two Limitation Act cases. While
it is unclear whether Verbeeck explictly was reversed,"3 9 the Sec-
ond Circuit subsequently corrected its analysis by vacating and
withdrawing the Verbeeck decision. 140 The Second Circuit now ad-
heres to the established rule. 4
In 1972, the United States District Court for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania, in Complaint of G.D.R.M.S. Caldas,'42 Simi_
larly followed the approach of Gilmore and Black, citing the
Verbeeck opinion (despite its having been vacated and withdrawn)
and one of the Limitation Act cases relied on in Verbeek. Further,
although Gilmore and Black state the Caldas case "held" that the
burden of proof to show absence of personal negligence was on the
carrier, 43 the Caldas case expressly held that the cargo owner had
137. 269 F.2d 68 (2d Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 273 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1959).
138. Id. at 71.
139. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 896-97 n.106c; Thede, supra note 13, at 986.
140. 273 F.2d 61 (2d Cir. 1959).
141. E.g., In re Ta Clu Navigation (Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1982).
142. 350 F Supp. 566 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 679 (3d Cir. 1973).
143. GnMoR. & BLACK, supra note 7, at 897.
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been unable to show the cause of the fire.' Thus, the Caldas com-
ments on carrier's burden of proof are dictum because after the
carrier has proved that fire damaged the cargo, the cargo owner
must establish the cause of the fire to have any basis for an action
against the carrier.
Finally, by the time of the Sunkist decision in 1979,"' 5 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit effected the
first significant departure from the burden of proof rule concerning
personal neglect of the carrier. Sunkist held that where the claim
is that unseaworthiness due to lack of due diligence causes fire
damage to cargo, the seaworthiness provisions prevail. At least to
the extent that after the cargo owner shows unseaworthiness has
caused the fire, the carrier has the burden of showing no personal
lack of due diligence. For any other cause of a fire, Sunkist specifi-
cally maintains the traditional rule that the burden of proof for
personal negligence rests on the cargo owner.
Other commentators correctly have criticized the legal analysis
and reasoning of the Sunkist court.14 Perhaps the United States
Solicitor General's comments strike the correct diplomatic note:
"There are observations in the opinion of the court of appeals that,
if taken out of context, could serve as the basis for novel admiralty
doctrine.' 147 Four aspects of Sunkist deserve comment: (1) the
court's reliance on the Asbestos case; (2) the court's reliance on its
own past cases; (3) the court's reliance on Maxine Footwear and
the Canadian COGSA and (4) the court's interpretation of the
COGSA statutory scheme without reference to its historical
context.
A. The Asbestos Corp. Case
In Sunkist, the Ninth Circuit found the Second Circuit case of
Asbestos Corp. Ltd. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et
144. 350 F Supp. at 573.
145. 603 F.2d 1327 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
146. See, e.g., Calani, The Eternal Conflict Between Cargo and Hull: The Fire Statute
A Shifting Scene, 55 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 417 (1981).
147. Comment, supra note 127, at 1162 n.108 (quoting the brief for the United States as
Amicus Curiae on Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit at 8 n.4, Adelaide Shipping Lines, Ltd. v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 603
F.2d 1327, 1979 A.M.C. 2787 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980)).
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Cypnen Fabre,'148 "closely in point and misread by the District
Court.' 1 49 The Court of Appeals in Sunkist sought to use Asbestos
Corp. as authority for the proposition that the appropriate proce-
dure in a case involving possible lack of due diligence for seawor-
thiness and fire damage to cargo is to decide the issue under
COGSA Sections 1303(1) and 1304(1), thus placing the burden of
proof for lack of due diligence on the carrier. 150 As the Article has
shown, however, both the trial and appellate opinions in Asbestos
Corp. correctly applied the traditional procedural and substantive
aspects of the Fire Provisions. The problem with Asbestos Corp.
was the confusing language of the appellate opinion, not the actual
application of the Fire Provisions. 5 1
The District Court opinion in Asbestos Corp. shows that the
court moved step by step through the procedural stages of the Fire
Provisions and applied them as the controlling law for determining
carrier liability in a case involving fire damage to cargo. At the ap-
pellate level, the Second Circuit's somewhat confusing discussion
first examining the findings on unseaworthiness due to lack of due
diligence, and then examining the application of the Fire Provi-
sions, appears to have contributed to the Sunkist court's mistaken
belief that this meant that Asbestos Corp. had appraised the un-
seaworthiness claim under sections 1303(1) and 1304(1) without
considering the Fire Provisions. With that perspective, the Ninth
Circuit then contended that it was careless dictum by the appellate
court in Asbestos Corp. to comment that the burden of proof of
carrier's negligence under the Fire Provision shifts to the cargo
owner once the carrier shows fire caused the damage. Thus, Sun-
kist says of the Asbestos Corp. appellate court that there was "cas-
ual treatment" of the burden of proof and that the author of the
Asbestos Corp. opinion "completely overlooks"' 52 the allocation of
the burden of proof in sections 1303(1) and 1304(1), and that bur-
den must be borne by the carrier under all circumstances in due
148. 480 F.2d 669 (2d Cir. 1973).
149. 603 F.2d at 1335.
150. See supra notes 113-23 and accompanying text for discussion of Sunkzst's use of the
Asbestos Corp. decision. See supra notes 109-12 and accompanying text for appraisal of the
Asbestos Corp. decision.
151. 603 F.2d at 1335.
152. Id. at 1335-36.
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diligence as to seaworthiness claims. The Ninth Circuit's analysis
of Asbestos was incorrect because, despite the Second Circuit's
separate discussion of the issues of unseaworthiness and personal
neglect, that court did not adopt the concept of dominancy of the
COGSA seaworthiness provisions over either of the Fire
Provsions. 153
B. The Albina, Liberty Shipping and Waterman Ninth Circuit
Cases
Sunkist relied on three of the Ninth Circuit's earlier appellate
decisions, Albina Engine & Machine Workers v. Hershey Choco-
late Corp.,154 New York Co. v. Liberty Shipping Corp.,'55 and Wa-
terman Steamship Corp. v. Gay Cottons.56 Both Albina and Lib-
erty Shipping claim to use the analytical structure of the Fire
Provisions to find conduct of the carriers that, as personal lack of
due diligence, was personal "neglect" or "fault" under the Fire
Provisions.'57 Regarding the burden of proof as to carrier's negli-
gence, the district court in Albina contradicts Sunkist, stating that
the cargo owner must prove "that the cause of the fire was due to
design or neglect of the owner.' 58 The Sunkist court used the Lib-
erty Shipping case for authority that the burden is on the carrier,
because the case did not explicitly place the burden of proof on the
cargo owner. Liberty Shipping did not consider that issue. Ade-
quate proof of carrier neglect was present to satisfy the appellate
court on review. Liberty Shipping concluded that substantively
the deficiencies showed unseaworthiness due to personal lack of
due diligence of the carrier. 59 Sunkist read that as meaning that
Liberty Shipping implied that the procedure of section 1304(1),
with its burden of proof on the carrier, was also to apply in fire
cases, rather than the approach followed in the Fire Provisions.
Finally, Waterman was a limitation of liability case in which the
153. In re Ta Cli Navigation (Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1982); see supra
notes 109-12.
154. 184 F Supp. 134 (D. Or. 1960), aff'd, 295 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1961).
155. 509 F.2d 1249 (9th Cir. 1975).
156. 414 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1969).
157. See Liberty Shipping, 509 F.2d at 1251-52; Albina, 295 F.2d at 621-22.
158. 184 F Supp. at 139.
159. 509 F.2d at 1250-52.
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court did not even mention the Fire Provisions. The court referred
to COGSA section 1304, the due diligence as to seaworthiness pro-
vision, with its basis of vicarious liability. The court then immedi-
ately concluded that the Limitation Act language of "privity or
knowledge" required a showing of personal lack of due diligence.
In the setting of these two references, the court said that the stan-
dards under the Limitation Act are different from those of
COGSA.6 0 Waterman, however, was referring only to COGSA sec-
tion 1304 rather than all of COGSA, which includes the Fire Provi-
sion. The Ninth Circuit in Sunkist, however, was convinced that
Waterman "by implication" held that the same standard of con-
duct would not apply to any of COGSA. 61
The standard of "personal negligence only," as a basis for quali-
fication under the Limitation Act, obviously differs from a stan-
dard of liability based on either personal negligence or negligent
conduct of servants and agents under COGSA section 1304(1). The
issue arose in Waterman in a context indicating that a carrier
could be vicariously liable under 1304(1) and still be able to limit
liability under the Limitation Act (by showing a lack of personal
neglect). 6 2 Waterman did not even suggest that it had the COGSA
Fire Provision in mind regarding the standard of liability under
that provision, regarding the relation of the Fire Provisions to sec-
tion 1304(1), or most especially regarding any shifting of the bur-
den of proof. All that can be said from Sunkist's discussion of Wa-
terman is the truism that the carrier wili have liability for personal
negligence and will not receive any relief from the Fire Provision
for that negligence, once established. The justification for the
Ninth Circuit's view regarding appropriate locus of the burden of
proof in conflicts between the Fire Provisions and COGSA section
1304(1) is lost in the gossamer syntax of the Sunkist opinion.
C. The Maxine Footwear Case and the Canadian COGSA
Sunkist relied on the British Privy Council case of Maxine Foot-
wear Co., Ltd. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine, Ltd.,"6 3
160. 414 F.2d at 731.
161. 603 F.2d at 1339.
162 414 F.2d at 728-31.
163. 1959 A.C. 589, [1959] 2 Lloyd's List L.R. 105.
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which considered the Canadian COGSA Fire Provision, a statute
identical to our COGSA Fire Provision. Maxine Footwear held
that under the Canadian COGSA, the due diligence as to seawor-
thmess provision dominated the Fire Provision. Thus, unseawor-
thiness due to lack of due diligence claims in cases of fire damage
had to be determined by the Canadian counterpart to our sections
1303(1) and 1304(1), with the possibility of vicarious liability and
with the burden on the carrier to prove neither personal lack of
due diligence nor vicarious liability under the concept of nondele-
gable duty
The Sunkist reliance on Maxine Footwear and the Canadian
COGSA was misplaced. The principal points that the Sunkist
court makes about Maxine being persuasive authority are (1) that
the Canadian and the United States COGSA both are derived from
the same international agreement, although both were enacted as
national statutes;1 4 (2) that, unless American law is to the con-
trary, American courts should strive for consistency with foreign
court decisions;165 and, (3) that the Canadian authorities on the
Hague Rules should be followed to promote uniformity 166 Ameri-
can law and congressional intent, however, are contrary to the
Sunkist holding for several reasons: (1) the legal history of the Fire
Statute since 1851 that holds otherwise;6 7 (2) the Fire Statute's
continuation as expressly unaffected by the Harter Act; (3) the Su-
preme Court case of Earle & Stoddert, upholding the primacy of
the Fire Statute's elimination of vicarious liability when in conflict
with the duty of due diligence as to seaworthiness; (4) the Fire
Statute's continuation as expressly unmodified by COGSA, (5) the
judicial infusion of Fire Statute law into the COGSA Fire Provi-
sion for nearly fifty years; (6) the virtually unanimous rule since
1936 that the Fire Provisions have the same meaning and opera-
tion;16 8 and (7) nearly fifty years of congressional and maritime in-
164. 603 F.2d at 1336.
165. Id. at 1338.
166. Id.
167. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. MN Leslie Lykes, 734 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1984) (sets
forth in a heavily researched opinion the trend of American case law on the Fire Provisions
in support of the Fifth Circuit's rejection of the Sunkist holding).
168. GrLMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 161 ("It has been assumed that 'actual fault or
privity' have the same meaning as 'design or neglect' and no case proceeds on any other
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dustry experience with the Fire Provisions, with no efforts at
amendment.
As a result, courts have read the entire body of Fire Statute law
since 1851 into the COGSA Fire Provision and the Fire Provisions
have exactly the opposite operation from Sunkist.69 Further, the
adoption of Maxine Footwear applies only for the COGSA Fire
Provision, and COGSA expressly leaves the Fire Statute unmodi-
fied. All the Sunkist court could do with this was to cast aside the
COGSA provision expressly stating that the Fire Statute continues
unmodified and to insist that the Fire Statute "must" be read m
light of COGSA. The Sunkist court maintains that to do otherwise
would "nullify" the COGSA's provisions regarding due diligence
and burden of proof as to due diligence. 170 In a particular situation
involving fire damage to cargo, a conflict may well exist between
the Fire Provisions and the due diligence as to seaworthiness pro-
vision. The issue, however, is which one Congress wished to give
way The existence for over one hundred thirty years of the Fire
Statute as the specific expression of congressional policy regarding
fire damage, its dominant position in court decisions prior to
COGSA's enactment, and the statute's continuation under COGSA
with its accumulated law read into the COGSA Fire Provision give
what seems a clear answer as to interpretation of COGSA-the
Sunkist decision is wrong.
Sunkzst's discrepancies extend beyond those discussed in this
Article. 71 Discussion on Sunkist, however, cannot be closed with-
out pointing out that the Supreme Court case of Earle & Stoddart,
a leading case in the field of fire damage to cargo, is not, as stated
in Sunkist, another "stowage case,' 72 that is, a case involving neg-
ligent stowage of cargo. Sunkist insists that this class of cases is
irrelevant because it deals with the negligent care of cargo, not
theory."); In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 228-29 (2d Cir. 1982); see
supra, notes 90-97 and accompanying text; see also supra, notes 102-08 and accompanying
text for further discussion on the nonapplicability of Maxine Footwear to American man-
time law.
169. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. MV "Leslie Lykes", 734 F.2d 199, 207 (5th Cir.
1984); In re Ta Chi Navigation (Panama) Corp., 677 F.2d 225, 229 (2d Cir. 1982) (rejecting
Sunkist).
170. 603 F.2d at 1339.
171. See Calamari, supra note 146 (rejection of Sunkist).
172. 603 F.2d at 1340.
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with lack of due diligence as to seaworthiness. Still, in Earle &
Stoddert, the ship's chief engineer piled new coal on smoldering
coal in a coal bunker, 73 creating an unseaworthy condition. Under
COGSA cection 1303(3), a vital part of the carrier's duty of sea-
worthiness is to "properly man, equip and supply the ship." No
seaman would think an unseaworthy condition in a ship's fuel sup-
ply constitutes a cargo storage case.
D Efforts to Correct Sunkist
The Second Circuit has attempted to correct the Ninth Circuit's
mistaken reading of the Asbestos case. In In re Complaint of Ta
Chi Navigation Corp., S. A., 4 the appellate court reversed a dis-
trict court decision that had followed Sunkist. The court empha-
sized its adherence to the well-established law of the Fire Provi-
sions and especially the rule that the cargo owner bears the burden
to establish the "design or neglect" or "actual fault or privity" of
the carrier. 5 In a strong rebuke of the Ninth Circuit, the Second
Circuit stated:
Unfortunately, the district court patterned its holding upon that
of the Ninth Circuit in Sunkist In Sunkist, the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the burden of proof is on the carrier to show that
it exercised due diligence to provide a seaworthy ship in order to
invoke the provisions of either section 1304(2)(b) or the Fire
Statute commenting on this court's holding m Asbestos
Corp. that the shipper must prove that the carrier's negli-
gence caused the fire damage, the Ninth Circuit stated that the
'use of this language was entirely unnecessary' and constituted a
'casual treatment of the burden of proof by the author of the
appellate court opinion.' We disagree not only with Sun-
kist's unflattering characterization of Judge Timbers' opinion in
Asbestos, an opinion that was concurred in by Judges Smith and
Hayes, but also with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the
interrelation between the Fire Statute and COGSA, an interpre-
tation that is concurred in by no other Circuit.17
173. 287 U.S. 420, 424 (1932).
174. 677 F.2d 225 (2d Cir. 1982).
175. Id. at 229.
176. Id.
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The court then went on to reiterate:
When Congress wanted to put the burden of proving freedom
from fault on a shipowner claiming the benefit of an exemption,
it specifically said so. See 46 U.S.C. § 1304(2)(q). The Sunkist
court would read the language of subsection (q) into subsection
(b) [the Fire Provision], 'although Congress did not put it there.'
This Court has not put it there either.1
The Second Circuit rendered the Ta Chi decision prior to the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Hasbro Industries v. MIS St. Constan-
tine.178 That may explain in part the reason for the Hasbro deci-
sion's clarification of the Sunkist case and its emphasis that the
Ninth Circuit had stopped at the "half-way house" in applying the
COGSA section 1304(1) duty of due diligence as to seaworthiness
in fire damage to cargo cases. Sunkist and Hasbro require the car-
rier to carry the burden of proof of lack of personal neglect, once
the cargo owner has proved an unseaworthy condition and that the
unseaworthiness has caused the fire or has prevented timely extm-
guishment of the fire, thus causing fire damage to cargo. The car-
rier will still have no liability based on vicarious liability. One
problem with Sunkist and Hasbro is that the cases start from the
premise that Congress in enacting COGSA meant for the due dili-
gence as to seaworthiness duty to be "overriding," but then ignore
the solution of the Maxine Footwear case, so heavily relied upon in
Sunkist. Maxine Footwear treated the seaworthiness provision as
completely overriding and controlling, so that where it applied, the
carrier would simply lose all benefit of the COGSA Fire Provision
and be liable on the basis of vicarious liability for conduct of all
servants and agents.
A recent comment on this issue of burden of proof in case of
conflict of the COGSA duty of due diligence as to seaworthiness
and the Fire Provision suggests that historical legal research shows
that Congress simply had no intent concerning the dominance of
one provision over the other.17 9 The contention is that courts might
best deal with the tension between the statutory provisions by fol-
lowing the approach of Hasbro and shifting the burden of proof of
177. Id.
178. 705 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
179. Comment, Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases, supra note 129.
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lack of personal due diligence from the cargo owner to the car-
rier. 180 While far more lucid than the Sunkist analysis, the com-
ment still does not avoid the fact that the Fire Statute was ex-
pressly retained and unmodified by COGSA, that the courts had
interpreted the Fire Statute in unseaworthiness cases to require
the cargo owner to show the carrier's personal lack of due dili-
gence, and that the express understanding of Congress, and the
courts since then, was that the two Fire Provisions were to have
the same meaning.
The comment does challenge the Ta Chi argument that Con-
gress intended no change in the Fire Provisions's burden of proof
as to carrier's personal negligence. 8' The Ta Chi argument is that
Congress showed this implicitly when Congress expressly stated
that the carrier had the burden of proof as to lack of negligence in
COGSA section 1304(2)(q)-the catch-all section for "any other
cause" for which the carrier might seek exemption. 182 Silence as to
the Fire Provisions meant, therefore, that the burden of proof was
to remain on the cargo owner. The comment employs legislative
history in arguing that the wording of section 1304(2)(q) fails to
show that Congress consciously opposed any changes in other bur-
dens of proof.183
Whatever the merits of the comment's section 1304(2)(q) argu-
ment, Congress certainly had the importance of burdens of proof
m mind when enacting COGSA. For examples of congressional in-
tent, note the express burden of proof on the carrier in the seawor-
thiness provision and the burden of proof in section 1304(2)(q).
COGSA recognizes the importance of allocating burdens of proof
as to lack of due diligence or neglect, and the drafters of the stat-
ute were fully aware of the law on the burden of proof in the Fire
Statute. In leaving the Fire Statute unamended when drafting the
Harter Act, Congress implied that the Fire Statute was dominant
over the duty of due diligence as to seaworthiness.8 4 Ultimately,
180. Id. at 1166.
181. Id. at 1157-59.
182. 677 FY2d at 229.
183. Comment, Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases, supra note 129, at 1157-
59, 1153-54.
184. 46 U.S.C. § 186 (1976) (Harter Act to have no effect on the Fire Statute); Earle &
Stoddart Inc v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, Ltd. 287 U.S. 420, 427 (1932).
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the problem for the writers is the same as for the Ninth Circuit in
Sunkist; the Fire Statute will not silently slip away m the analysis.
Unlike Sunkist, the comment at least faces the issue and argues
for a new interpretation of the Fire Statute that would bring it
into conformity with the burden of proof in the Limitation Act. 18 5
Other courts either have concluded that the facts of a particular
case did not require a decision on the validity of the Sunkist ap-
proach, 8 6 or have simply rejected that approach. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. MIV Leslie Lykes,'1 7 rejected the decision of the
district court that accepted the Sunkist holding because it consid-
ered Sunkist as directly contrary both to the Supreme Court deci-
sion in Earle & Stoddart and to the "time honored approach" with
which the Fire Provisions had been handled.' In a well-
researched opinion, the Fifth Circuit found the Second Circuit's
rejection of Sunkist in Ta Chi compelling and emphasized the im-
portance of the courts' conforming to congressional policy in ap-
plying the Fire Provisions:
Both Congress and the Supreme Court have made it clear that
the Fire Statue is to be applied broadly, and the exception to
the defense for fires 'caused by the design or neglect of such
owner' must be viewed narrowly." [quoting the Supreme
Court that the Fire Statute is not to be administered "with a
tight and grudging hand."]'
185. Comment, Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases, supra note 129, at 1162-
63, 1156-57. Under the Limitation Act, the carrier has the burden of proving lack of per-
sonal negligence to secure the liability limitation. See supra note 134 and accompanying
text.
186. EAC Timberlane v. Pisces, Ltd., 580 F Supp. 99, 115-16 (D.P.R. 1983), aff'd, 745
F.2d 715 (1st Cir. 1984). The district court noted the Second Circuit-Ninth Circuit split on
the burden of proof issue in a due diligence as to seaworthiness question, but said this was
not an issue raised in the case at hand, because the carrier had chosen to prove affirmatively
that the fire had occurred without any fault of the carrier, and had done so. In Ionar
Compania Naviera, S.A. v. Central of Ga. Ry., 471 F Supp. 942, 954 (S.D. Ga. 1979), va-
cated, 666 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1982), the district court stated the general rule, noted the
Sunkist decision, and then held that under either approach no personal negligence of the
carrier had been established. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded for other
reasons.
187. 734 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1984).
188. Id. at 206-07.
189. Id. at 208.
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With the exception of the Ninth Circuit, and then only in the
case of alleged cause of fire damage to cargo by unseaworthiness
resulting from lack of due diligence, 190 courts overwhelmingly have
supported the rule that the cargo owner must carry the burden of
proof to establish not only the cause of the fire, but also the per-
sonal negligence of the carrier and the nexus between the carrier's
negligence and the event causing the fire. The cargo owner must
prove its cause of action against the carrier. The continued support
for this rule, in the face of attacks that confuse the Fire Provisions
with the Limitation Act, again suggests that courts prefer a liberal
interpretation of the Fire Provisions.
E. The Fire Provisins Under the Hamburg Rules
The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by
Seal9' ("Hamburg Rules") is an international agreement drawn up
in 1978, following a conference sponsored by the United Nations
on revising the law on the carriage of goods. 2 Article 5(4) of the
Hamburg Rules would, if the United States became a party to the
agreement, replace the current Fire Provision with a significantly
different provision. Under the Hamburg Rules, carriers would have
liability for "loss of or damage to the goods or delay in delivery
caused by fire, if the claimant proves that the fire arose from fault
or neglect on the part of the carrier, his servants or agents."'93 A
corresponding provision on fault or neglect requires the carrier to
take all measures reasonably required to put out the fire and to
avoid or mitigate its consequences. 9 4 Thus, the Hamburg Rules
would end the statutory elimination in the United States of vicari-
ous liability in fire damage to cargo. The cargo owner would still
bear the burden of proof as to negligence, but vicarious liability
would be available as a basis for carrier liability
Interestingly, the Hamburg Rules express the general policy that
the carrier should be liable for damage to cargo unless the carrier
190. See supra notes 113-24, 145-70 and accompanying text.
191. 6 BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 1-32.2.
192. See, e.g., Developments, Risk of Loss in Shipping Under the Hamburg Rules, 10
DEN J. INT'L L. & POL'y 568 (1981).
193. 6 BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 1-32.2, 1-35 (emphasis added).
194. Id.
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can prove the absence of any negligence by the carrier, its servants,
or agents.195 Elsewhere, then, the burden of proving absence of
negligence is on the carrier. Even under the Hamburg Rules, how-
ever, the burden of proof as to negligence in fire damage rests on
the cargo owner, and thus, the carrier still would have greater pro-
tection against fire risk than other causes of cargo damage. Even
so, the Hamburg Rules would alter drastically the Fire Provisions'
allocation of risk between carrier and cargo. For that reason, such
a change is a matter for Congress, based on the weighing of Ameri-
can shipping and cargo interests. 96
VI. THE JUDICIAL STANDARDS FOR FINDING ACTIONABLE "DESIGN OR
NEGLECT" OR "ACTIAL FAULT OR PRIVITY" UNDER THE FIRE
PROVISIONS
The Fire Provisions provide that the carrier is liable for cargo
damages by fire only if negligent conduct directly attributable to
the carrier has caused the fire.197 Further, the cargo owner bears
the burden of proof once the carrier establishes the applicability of
the Fire Provisions by proving that the cargo was damaged by
fire.198 Ultimately, in order to succeed, the cargo owner must prove;
(1) the cause of the fire, (2) negligent conduct of the carrier, and
(3) a sufficient nexus between that negligent conduct and the caus-
ative event to say that the carrier's negligence caused the fire.199
Such burdens are weighty. The fire may have damaged or de-
stroyed the vessel and cargo. Much time may have passed. Many of
the details, if known at all, may be known only by reticent master,
officers, and crew.
In light of such difficulties, do courts employ an impartial judi-
195. See Developments, supra note 192, at 571.
196. Id. at 575-76. That conclusions on alterations in the balance of carrier and cargo
interests established by the Fire Provisions require vigorous assessment by experts knowl-
edgeable of the economics of the international maritime carriage trade is evident. For illus-
trative questions, see, Comment, Burden of Proof in Marine Fire Damage Cases, supra note
129.
197. 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-9; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 161. An early
and leading case is Walker v. The Transp. Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 150 (1865).
198. 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-9; GILMORE & BLACK supra note 7, at 896.
199. Connell Bros. Co. v. Sevenseas Trading & S.S. Co., S.A. (The Salina Cruz), 111 F.
Supp. 227, 1953 A.M.C. 837 (N.D. Cal. 1953), reu'd, 220 F.2d 511 (4th Cir. 1955); see also
supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
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cial approach in requiring the cargo owner to prove its case, or do
they try to aid the cargo owner9 Courts might help cargo owners in
many ways. For example, they could require only minimal evidence
to support findings favorable to the cargo owner, or they could ap-
ply various presumptions to ease the cargo owner's burden of
proof. Also, since carriers are usually corporations, requiring a
cargo owner to show negligent conduct by an official with sufficient
authority to be a "managing" official, courts might stretch that
concept to apply vicarious liability under the facade of finding di-
rect, negligent conduct of the carrier.
These questions are important to both practitioners and schol-
ars. If courts favor the cargo owner, they undermine the Fire Pro-
visions and the congressional intent by shifting burdens of proof to
create exceptions to the rule prohibiting vicarious liability Modern
Fire Provision cases200 illustrate that courts are balanced and fair-
minded in carrying out the congressional intent behind the Fire
Provisions.
A. The Judicial Standard for Proof of Cause of the Fire
Courts generally refuse to accept speculation about the cause of
the fire as proof. In Connell Brothers Co. v. Sevenseas Trading &
Steamship Co.,201 for example, a fire broke out on a foreign vessel
between two boilers only twenty-four hours after crewmen
rebricked them. As a result, the ship sank. The cargo owner
claimed the rebricking was negligent. Although the cargo owner
showed that the fire generated heavy black smoke, suggesting an
oil fire, and that an oil line running over the boilers could have
burst, causing the fire,2 °2 the court denied the proof as speculative.
It stated that the cargo owner must prove the cause of the fire, the
existence of design or neglect, and that such "design or neglect"
was that of the owner himself or of his managing agent.20 3 To pro-
duce a plausible theory of the fire's origin without positive evi-
200. Thede, supra note 6, at 982. For an extensive annotation of cases on the application
of the Fire Statute, see 25 AKL.R. FED. 287-324 (1975).
201. 111 F Supp. 227, 1953 A.M.C. 837 (N.D. Cal. 1953), rev'd, 220 F.2d 511 (4th Cir.
1955).
202. Id. at 230.
203. Id. at 229.
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dence from which one could infer the fire's origin and negate other
possible causes was insufficient proof.20 4
In Anthony Gibbs & Co. v. Munson S.S. Line (The
Munares), °5 a sudden dockside fire of unknown origin destroyed
the vessel with its cargo. The cargo owner alleged that the carrier
was personally negligent in allowing trash to accumulate beneath
the area of the dock that the carrier used, in failing to prohibit
smoking in and around the dock, in storing flammable materials on
the dock, in failing to move the vessel before the fire reached it, in
failing to move the cargo on the dock to safety, and in failing to
give a prompt alarm.20 6 The evidence showed public traffic behind
and on the dock was heavy
Considering proof of cause of the fire, the court stated:
[T]he most that can be said is that the record discloses a num-
ber of purely speculative suggestions as to the possible causes of
the fire. No one knows the exact point of its origin and what the
material was which first ignited it The most that can be
said is that the fire may have resulted from any one of several
causes, for some of which the respondents were responsible and
for some of which they are not. That is not enough [to hold for
the cargo owner], as the evidence here does not lead me to be-
lieve that the probabilities are that the fire resulted from the
respondents' negligence.20
The court in The Munaries further found no proof that a
quicker alarm could have reduced the damage, no proof that the
owner could have moved the cargo in time and no proof that the
ship's crew had the capability to move the vessel in time to escape
the fire. "Sufficient be it to say that in my judgment the entire
matter rests in the realm of speculation. '20 s
In Complaint of G.D.R.M.S. Caldas,20 9 a fire of unknown origin
broke out in a cabin where the master had confined a depressed,
suicidal seaman. The seaman may have had matches and he disap-
204. Id. at 229-30.
205. 12 F Supp. 913 (E.D. La. 1935).
206. Id. at 916-17.
207. Id. at 916.
208. Id. at 918.
209. 350 F Supp. 566, 1973 A.M.C. 1243 (E.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 405 F.2d 679 (3d Cir.
1973).
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peared during the fire. A physician had diagnosed the seaman as
suicidal and had recommended that any items he might use to
commit suicide be removed from his person. The court found the
cause of the fire speculative, noting that the only fact proved was
that the fire originated in the seaman's cabin.21 0
Two final cases illustrate the point that the cargo owner must do
more than establish "equality of possibility" as to the cause of the
fire. In Hoskyn & Co. v. Silver Line, Ltd.,21' the cargo owner
showed that the fire could have been caused by poor timing on the
carrying vessel's diesel engine, a problem known to the carrier. The
court allowed protection under the Fire Statute, because the car-
rier had offered an equally plausible cause for the fire and all other
evidence had been destroyed in the fire.2 12 In Rockwood & Co. v.
American President Lines (The President Jackson),213 fire broke
out near a welding operation four and one-half hours after comple-
tion of the work. A burned out light fixture with a scorched area
around it also was nearby Without examining the question of per-
sonal negligence under the Fire Statute, the court found no proof
that the welding caused the fire and held for the carrier.2"4
Courts also have recognized that the burden of proof rests with
the cargo owner and have refused to indulge in presumptions
merely to ease the cargo owner's burden. Gilmore and Black215 sug-
gest that if the carrier has violated statute or regulation, the statu-
tory fault rule of the Pennsylvania21 6 should apply to boost the
cargo owner over the hurdle of establishing causation of the fire.
The Pennsylvania Rule maintains that if a vessel is guilty of a
statutory fault prior to collision, then a presumption arises that
the fault contributed to the collision. Further, the vessel at fault
has the burden of establishing that the statutory fault could not
possibly have contributed to the collision. The effect of the Penn-
sylvania Rule often is harsh. Under general tort law, a statutory
210. Id. at 573, 576.
211. 143 F.2d 462, 1944 A.M.C. 895 (2d Cir. 1944).
212. Id. at 464-65.
213. 68 F Supp. 224 (D.N.J. 1946).
214. Id at 227.
215. GaMoRa & BLACK, supra note 7, at 898 n.106h.
216. 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125, 136 (1874). For discussion of the Pennsylvania Rule, see GEL-
MORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 494.
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violation is used only to establish the elements of duty and breach
of duty in a negligence action. The plaintiff still is required to
prove causation. Under the Pennsylvania Rule, even causation is
presumed.
The statutory fault rule has been applied in cargo damage cases
not involving fire to defeat a shipowner's claim to limitation of lia-
bility under the Limitation Act.21 7 Gilmore and Black, reasoning
from their erroneous interweaving of the Fire Statute with the
Limitation Act, state that "[t]here seems to be no reason to distm-
guish between the two statutes, with respect to applicability of the
'statutory fault' rule."21 8 If the courts were prepared to apply the
statutory fault rule in Fire Provisions cases, then the cargo owner
would receive substantial aid m establishing its case when the car-
rier had committed any statutory violation that could lead to a
fire. This presumption of causation would both establish the viola-
tion and the negligence as cause of the fire. Contrary to Gilmore
and Black, however, courts have refrained from using the Pennsyl-
vana Rule in Fire Provisions cases.
In Automobile Insurance Co. v. United Fruit Company,"9 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, m refusing
to apply the Pennsylvania Rule in a Fire Statute case, stated:
The immunity from liability for fire loss under the Fire Statute
is not conditioned upon compliance with other statutes, or with
Coast Guard Regulations There are no exceptions other
than those expressed in the statute itself, viz., 'unless such fire is
caused by the design or neglect of such owner'- We are not justi-
fied, in applying the doctrine of statutory fault, to engraft on the
Fire Statute the condition of compliance with requirements
found elsewhere, whether by statute or regulation. To allow the
application of the doctrine of statutory fault to supply the nec-
essary evidence to ratify the cargo interest's burden of proof of
establishing that the fire was caused by the design or neglect of
217. See, e.g., Waterman S.S. Corp. v. Gay Cottons (The Chickasaw), 414 F.2d 724, 1969
A.M.C. 1682 (9th Cir. 1969).
218. GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 898 n.106h. The authors state there that "[tihere
have been suggestions in some cases that the 'statutory fault' rule does not apply to Fire
Statute cases." Id. Rather than "suggestions," the language of fire damage to cargo cases
vigorously rejects the use of the statutory fault rule.
219. 224 F.2d 72, 1955 A.M.C. 1429 (2d Cir. 1955).
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the owner would serve to emasculate the Fire Statute by dilut-
ing the owner's immunity from fire loss liability.
[Regarding the burden of proof], since 1851 there has been no
indication of congressional intent to relieve cargo interests of
that burden [The rule is the same for the COGSA Fire
Provision.] We think it significant that no court has applied the
doctrine of statutory fault [to the Fire Provision]. We are un-
willing to allow a presumption supplied by the doctrine of statu-
tory fault to substitute for proof of cause required by the stat-
ute. To do so would at times result in shifting the burden of
proof to the owner of a vessel by requiring him to show freedom
from fault. This we believe would undermine the very purpose
of [the Fire Provisions] .220
B. The Judicial Standard for Proof of Negligent Conduct of the
Carrier
The question of carrier negligence has two parts: (1) whose negli-
gent conduct, for a corporate carrier, constitutes negligence attrib-
utable to the corporation; and (2) what conduct will constitute
negligence.
1. The Judicial Standard for Proof of Who is a Managing Agent
of the Carrier
A carrier, under the Fire Provisions, is not liable for the negli-
gent acts of its servants. 22 However, a corporation must act
through persons, and the long-standing rule is that, under the Fire
Provisions, negligent conduct of a corporation's "managing or su-
pervisory officials" or "shore managing representatives '222 consti-
tutes negligent conduct of the corporation. Principal executive of-
ficers clearly are such managing agents, but courts have adopted a
much broader reading.223 Conversely, the master, ship's officers,
and crew are clearly excluded. Liability for their acts would be the
classic example of vicarious liability
In defining "managing agents," commentators often rely on cases
220. Id. at 75.
221. 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-30; GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 161.
222. 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-30.
223. See id. at 14-31.
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arising under the Limitation Act.224 Because the Limitation Act
and the Fire Provisions are distinct statutory regimes that are sup-
ported by differing policies,225 reliance on Limitation Act cases is
suspect in the Fire Provisions context. Such reliance also poses
dangers. Some commentators suggest that modern courts have
taken a restrictive approach to granting shipowners the benefit of
limitation under the Act.226 If such hostility exists, unwarranted
confusion of Limitation Act precedent in a Fire Provision case
could unjustifiably deny the benefit of the provision to an owner
through improper definition of his employees as "managing
agents." If unchecked, such improper identification could impair
substantially the benefit Congress intended the Fire Provisions to
provide.227
The leading case arose under the Limitation Act, Coryell v.
Phipps (The Seminole).228 In that case, the Supreme Court inter-
preted a shipowner's neglect to require, in the case of an individ-
ual, "some personal participation" in the negligent conduct that
caused the loss or injury and in the case of a corporate shipowner,
negligence on the part of some "executive officer, manager or su-
perintendent whose scope of authority includes supervision over
the phase of business out of which the loss or injury occurred."22 9
Courts apparently do not strain to define lower level corporate em-
ployees as managing agents of the carrier. Cases on the Fire Provi-
sions hold that the negligence of a vessel's master, officers, and
crew, or of lower level shore-based employees, or of independent
contractors 230 is not imputed to the carrier under the Fire Provi-
sions. 23 1 If the carrier places the direction of a significant part of
224. See, e.g., GILmoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 884; Thede, supra note 6, at 984.
225. See supra notes 25-41 and accompanying text.
226. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 821-23; Donovan, supra note 5, at 1034-37.
227. Thede, supra note 6, at 971 touches on this briefly.
228. 317 U.S. 406, 1943 A.M.C. 18 (1943).
229. Id. at 410.
230. See 2A BENEDicT, supra note 8, at 14-30.
231. Id. at 14-32ff. A leading case is Consumers Import Co. v. Kawasaki Kiser Kabushikl
Kaisha (The Venice Maru), 133 F.2d 781, 785, 1943 A.M.C. 277, 281 (2d Cir. 1943), aff'd,
320 U.S. 249, 1943 A.M.C. 1209 (1943); see also, Albma Eng. & Mach. Works v. Hershey
Chocolate Corp., 295 F.2d 619, 621-22, 1961 A.M.C. 2215 (9th Cir. 1961); The Older, 65 F.2d
359, 360, 1933 A.M.C. 936 (2d Cir. 1933); 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-32 ("If a vessel
owner delegates to an independent agency of good repute the duty of laying out and super-
vising the stowage of a vessel or making her seaworthy; and the negligence of those
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its business operations under the control of an independent con-
tractor, however, courts may find that the contractor is in effect a
managing agent. For example, in Petition of Skibs A/S Jolund,232
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held
that an independent contractor to whom the carrier had delegated
complete management authority over the vessel was to be treated
as a managing agent.233 In contrast, the carrier in Consumers Im-
port Co. v. Kawasaki Kabushiki Kaisha (The Venice Maru)234 re-
tained an independent contractor, a marine surveyor, to develop
and carry out a stowage plan for fishmeal cargo. Although the
marine surveyor had not supervised the stowage of fishmeal before,
he had extensive maritime experience, had served as an officer
aboard a vessel carrying fishmeal, and according to the court, was
the best man for the job. The court refused to impute the marine
surveyor's negligence to the carrier. The court noted that the
marine surveyor's duties were limited to the stowage of cargo and
that he had no power to control the movement of the carrier's ves-
sels or the activities of their crews, or to bind the owner to a con-
tract. 3 5 In A/S J Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v. Accinanto, Ltd.
(The Ocean Liberty),36 the court stated that it would not treat the
negligence of a stevedore as that of the carrier when the carrier
exercised no control over the loading.
Frequently, opinions do not discuss the specific person or corpo-
ration that the court would view as possessing sufficient manage-
ment or supervisory authority to act on behalf of the corporation's
carrier. However, certain titles suggest authority in the maritime
industry In addition to executive officers, those who are general
agents, port captains, port engineers, general superintendents, and
marine superintendents 2 7 have been held to have sufficient au-
thority to say that their conduct was that of the carrier.
The Fire Statute case of Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. The S.S.
[delegatees] is the proximate cause of subsequent fire loss of cargo, that negligence does not
of itself defeat the owner's right to the exemption of the Fire Statute.")
232. 250 F.2d 777, 1958 A.M.C. 277 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 933 (1958).
233. Id.
234. 133 F.2d 781, 1943 A.M.C. 277 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 320 U.S. 249, 1943 A.M.C. 1209 (1943).
235. Id. at 785.
236. 199 F.2d 134, 142 (4th Cir. 1952).
237. See 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-31; Thede, supra note 6, at 984 n.170.
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Robert Luckenbach238 suggests the Courts' reasonable approach. In
Hershey, negligent welding by the employee of an independent
contractor started a fire below decks while the carrier's Marine Su-
perintendent was aboard. The district court held that, in general,
negligence by this official would be that of the carrier. Because his
duties were unrelated to repair work and he acted immediately to
put out the fire, however, the court refused to attribute to the car-
rier any knowledge of the repair operation possessed by the Marine
Superintendent.23 9 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, in affirming, held that the Marine Superintendent
lacked sufficient authority to be viewed as a managing agent. 40 In
both decisions, the courts were careful not to find carrier action or
knowledge merely because of the presence of the Marine Superin-
tendent in the vicinity of the fire. Those decisions reflect the guid-
ance of the Supreme Court in the Coryell case calling for a focus
on the specific scope of authority of the corporate employee.
2. The Judicial Standard of Proof for Negligence Under The
Fire Provisions
If the courts wished to restrict the benefit of the Fire Provisions,
a simple tactic would be to require only minimal evidence to sup-
port a finding that a carrier's personal conduct, or the conduct di-
rectly attributed to a corporate carrier by its managing agents, was
negligent.24 1 Indeed, Gilmore and Black virtually Invite the courts
to abandon concern for precedent or congressional authority in de-
terminmg whether a carrier has been negligent under the Limita-
tion Act or the Fire Provisions:
'Pnvity or knowledge' and 'design or neglect' are phrases devoid
of meaning. They are empty containers into which the courts are
free to pour whatever content they will. The statutes might
238. 184 F Supp. 134 (D. Or. 1960), aff'd sub noma., Albma Eng. & Mach. Works, Inc. v.
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 295 F.2d 619, 1961 A.M.C. 2215 (9th Cir. 1961).
239. Id. at 139-40.
240. 295 F.2d at 622.
241. See Donovan, supra note 7, at 1036 (quoting a report of the Maritime Law Associa-
tion of the United States based on an analysis of limitation cases for the period 1952-1976,
to the effect that the courts have become more reluctant to grant limitation and that the
courts have "especially seized upon the 'privity or knowledge' language of the act as the
point of their attack").
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quite as well say that the owner is entitled to exoneration from
liability or to limitation of liability if, on all the equities of the
case, the court feels that the result is desirable; [N]o judge
with the slightest flair for the lawyer's craft of distinguishing
cases need ever be bound by precedent 242
In the context of their criticism of the Limitation Act and their
approval and appreciation of a restrictive interpretation, Gilmore
and Black plainly are calling for the courts to scuttle the Fire Pro-
visions along with the Limitation Act. Confusing the Fire Provi-
sions with the Limitation Act prompts this incorrect suggestion.
The terms "privity or knowledge" and "design or neglect" are no
more "empty containers" than the myriad of concepts that a court
must "fill" with content. For example, such elements of a negli-
gence cause of action as duty, breach of duty, and proximate cause
all necessarily call for judicial activity to give them content for ap-
plication. Thus, the courts are often in a sense "free" in many ar-
eas of the law to exercise discretion. Ultimately, the vital question
remains whether courts will seek to be guided in substantial part
by precedent in making and applying standards, or whether they
will decide each case on its face, without regard to precedent. Rea-
sonable discretion is not unbridled discretion. In their rush to de-
stroy the Limitation Act, Gilmore and Black's proposal strikes at
the core of our system of judicial decision, both in terms of respect
of courts for their own precedent and of respect for the authority
of Congress under the concept of separation of powers.
Gilmore and Black notwithstanding, most courts appear impar-
tially to apply normal standards of negligence, suggesting again,
that courts are not rushing to restrict the benefits of the Fire Pro-
visions. In Hanson & Orth Inc. v. M/V Jalatarang,243 negligent un-
loading by a stevedore crew started a fire in a cargo of burlap and
jute. The vessel's crew unsuccessfully fought the fire and the fire
department for the Georgia Port Authority finally extinguished it.
The court ruled that any negligent fire fighting by the crew would
not be attributable to the carrier, but that a failure properly to
tram and equip the crew could constitute personal negligence of
the carrier under the Fire Provisions. The evidence in Hanson con-
242. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 877.
243. 450 F Supp. 528 (S.D. Ga. 1978).
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flicted as to whether the crew attacked the fire quickly enough fol-
lowing the alarm, whether the fire hose was long enough, and
whether the hose had a nozzle. The master testified that crewmen
were not permitted to stand near unloading operations, that the
crew responded within two minutes of the alarm, that the hose
used was long enough to reach the fire in the lower hold, and that
the hose had a nozzle. The court, in finding the carrier not person-
ally negligent under the Fire Provisions, noted that the rapid
spread of the fire made it unlikely that the crew could have extin-
guished it under any circumstances.244
In Consumers Import Co. v. Kawasaki Kabushiki Kaisha (The
Venice Maru),245 a stowage plan developed by an independent con-
tractor led to the spontaneous combustion of fish meal that led to
a fire.246 The court found that the carrier was not negligent in fail-
Ing to inform the surveyor about the recurring problem with spon-
taneous combustion in fish meal cargo, because the problem was
well known and pervasive in the industry, and there was no show-
ing that the surveyor did not in fact discuss the problem with the
charterer's masters.247
In Hershey Chocolate Corp. v. S.S. Robert Luckenback,24 s negli-
gent welding by a repair crew started a cargo fire in the hold. Be-
cause the repairs required the removal of a portion of the vessel's
fire lines, the carrier's port engineer directed the vessel's chief en-
gineer to run an alternate line. The chief engineer failed to run the
line due to neglect and the port engineer failed to follow up his
directive.249 The court allowed exoneration under the Fire Statute,
implicitly finding that the port engineer's failure to follow up his
directive for the alternate fire line did not constitute personal neg-
244. Id. at 540, 543.
245. 133 F.2d 781, 1943 A.M.C. 277 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 320 U.S. 249, 1943 A.M.C. 1209 (1943).
246. 133 F.2d at 784.
247. 39 F Supp. 349, 353, 1941 A.M.C. 640, 642 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (For the charterer to
assume that the surveyor knew of the problem was reasonable, because the problem was a
pervasive one in the industry.); see also 133 F.2d at 781, 785 (The surveyor had ample no-
tice of the problem and the charterer was reasonable m relying upon surveyor to investigate
the problem with the masters.).
248. 184 F Supp. 134 (D. Or. 1960), aff'd sub nom Albma Eng. & Mach. Works, Inc. v.
Hershey Chocolate Corp., 295 F.2d 619, 1961 A.M.C. 2215 (9th Cir. 1961).
249. 184 F Supp. at 136-37.
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ligence of the vessel owner.' 50 The failure of the assistant engineer,
a crewmember, to carry out the order clearly was not attributable
to the owner. Further, although the carrier's Marine Superinten-
dent was aboard when the fire broke out, his duties were unrelated
to repair, he did not know of the situation until after the fire broke
out, and he did all he could to put out the fire.
Appellate courts also appear impartial in treating these negligent
cases. In Accinanto, Ltd. v. Cosmopolitan Shipping Co. (The
Ocean Liberty),251 a cargo of ammonium nitrate exploded two
months after a similar explosion had resulted in disaster. The
United States District Court for the District of Maryland held the
carrier personally negligent for inadequate stowage and denied ex-
oneration under the Fire Provisions, finding that the carriage of
such gas was an ultrahazardous activity and that the earlier explo-
sion had put the carrier on notice. The district court also found
that the stowage, conducted under the guidance of the United
States Coast Guard, the Baltimore Fire Department and the New
York Board of Underwriters, was insufficient because the carrier
and the stevedore had a duty to seek independent scientific ad-
vice.252 The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed, ruling that the carrier had no control over the conduct of
the stowage such that the negligence of the stevedore would be im-
puted to the carrier and that the stowage under expert government
and industry guidance was not negligent, because the carrier was
not under a duty to seek independent scientific advice.2 53
Where courts have found a carrier negligent they have had suffi-
cient reason for doing so. 254 The most obvious breach of duty
would be a managing agent's affirmative act that was unreasonable,
given what the agent knew or should have known. More frequent
examples include instances of omission, a failure of a managing
250. Id. at 138-40.
251. 99 F Supp. 261 (D. Md. 1951), rev'd sub nom. A/S J. Ludwig Mowinckels Rederi v.
Accinanto, Ltd., 199 F.2d 134, 1952 A.M.C. 1681 (4th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 992
(1953).
252. 99 F Supp. at 264-66.
253. 199 F.2d at 138-43.
254. See, e.g., Asbestos Corp. v. Compagnie de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre,
480 F.2d 669, 1973 A.M.C. 1683 (2d Cir. 1973); Cerro Sales Corp. v. Atlantic Marine Enter-
prises, 403 F Supp. 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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agent to act properly under the circumstances. In both situations,
the failure to exercise reasonable care to learn important informa-
tion upon which to base responsible action on behalf of the carrier
often leads to liability255 The more common duties of a carrier in-
clude the duty to remedy practices or stowage conditions that are
significant fire risks;256 to hire a competent master, ship's officers,
and crew;257 to retain competent independent contractors;25s to
provide appropriate instructions and appropriate supervision to
ensure those instructions are carried out in any operation with fire
risks;25 to provide and maintain a master, ship's officers, and crew
adequately trained in fire fighting;260 and to provide sufficient fire-
fighting equipment appropriately located on the vessel.261
For each of the above duties, the courts generally find carrier
negligence only upon a substantial showing of unreasonable con-
duct under the circumstances.262 In short, the careful review and
weighing of the evidence, the lack of judicial criticism of the bene-
fit conferred by the Fire Provisions, and the emphasis of the courts
on the burden of proof that the cargo owner must bear all suggest
conscientious, fair-minded application of the negligence
standard.263
255. "The measure in such cases is not what the owner knows, but what he is charged
with finding out." Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Lloyd Brasileiro, 159 F.2d 661, 665 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 331 U.S. 836 (1947).
256. See The Doris Kellogg, 18 F Supp. 159, 166, 168 (S.D.N.Y. 1937), aff'd, 94 F.2d 1015
(2d Cir. 1938).
257. United States v. Charbonnier (The Pinellas), 45 F.2d 174, 176-78 (4th Cir. 1930).
258. 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-32.
259. See Hasbro Indus., Inc. v. M/S St. Constantine, 705 F.2d 339, 342 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 104 S. Ct. 537 (1983); Hines v. Butler, 278 F 877, 880 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 257
U.S. 659 (1921).
260. See Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Adelaide Shipping Lines, 603 F.2d 1327, 1341 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1012 (1980).
261. See Asbestos Corp. v. Compagme de Navigation Fraissinet et Cyprien Fabre, 480
F.2d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1973).
262. A reading of the cases in an extensive annotation on the Fire Statute at 25 A.L.R.
FED. 287 (1975), indicates the care of the courts in finding personal negligence of the carrier.
263. See supra note 254.
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VII. CARRIER CONDUCT BARRING APPLICATION OF THE FIRE
PROVISIONS
A. Wawer
A carrier clearly may waive its benefit under the Fire Provi-
sions.264 Courts do not readily find waiver, however. For example,
failing to refer to the Fire Statute in the bill of lading does not
constitute waiver.2 65 In order to find a contractual waiver, in fact,
courts have required clear language. 6 "The intention to contract
as against benefits conferred by the fire statute must be plain and
explicit "267 Courts first look to the bill of lading for evidence
of waiver.26 ' With the passage of the COGSA Fire Provision in
1936, the statutory rule for both Fire Provisions may be that the
only means of waiver is by clear language in the bill of lading that
covers a contract of carriage. Section 1305 of COGSA provides that
[a] carrier shall be at liberty to surrender in whole or in part all
or any of his rights and immunities or to increase any of his
responsibilities and liabilities under this Act, provided such sur-
render or increase shall be embodied in the bill of lading issued
to the shipper. 2
69
Two cases illustrate implementation of these waiver principles.
In Earle & Stoddart, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line,7 the Su-
preme Court considered whether the carrier implicitly had waived
the benefit of the Fire Statute by accepting what the cargo owner
264. "Undoubtedly, the benefits of the statute may be waived." Porter v. Bank Line (The
Poleric), 17 F.2d 513, 515 (E.D. Va. 1927), afl'd, 25 F.2d 843 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 278
U.S. 623 (1928); 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 14-38 (if the contract of carriage contains
provisions inconsistent with statutory fire exemptions, the carrier may lose the benefit of
the fire exemptions). See, regarding the COGSA Fire Provision, 46 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982)
(recognizing freedom of carrier's to surrender any right or immunity established under
COGSA).
265. See, e.g., Earle & Stoddert, Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, 287 U.S. 420, 429 (1932);
Porter v. Bank Line, Ltd. (The Poleric), 17 F.2d 513, 516 (E.D. Va. 1927), aff'd, 25 F.2d 843
(4th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 623 (1928); The Edmund Fanning, 105 F Supp. 353, 369-70
(S.D.N.Y. 1952).
266. See The Ida, 75 F.2d 278, 280 (2d Cir. 1935); Bank Line, Ltd. v. Porter, 25 F.2d 843,
846 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 278 U.S. 623 (1928).
267. Bank Line, Ltd. v. Porter, 25 F.2d 843, 846 (4th Cir. 1928).
268. See supra notes 265-66.
269. 46 U.S.C. § 1305 (1982).
270. 287 U.S. 420, 1933 A.M.C. 1 (1932).
630
FIRE DAMAGE TO CARGO
contended was a warranty of seaworthiness in the bill of lading. 71
The provision disavowed any liability for unseaworthiness, pro-
vided the carrier had exercised due diligence to make the vessel
seaworthy The Supreme Court chose to view the clause as a state-
ment of the general rule of liability for unseaworthiness rather
than as an express warranty for liability 27 2 Indeed, the carrier's
incorporation of the Fire Statute into the bill of lading suggested it
did not intend to contract away its benefit by agreeing to be
strictly liable for damage caused by unseaworthiness, including fire
damage.273 In Earle & Stoddart, the carrier retained the protection
of the Fire Statute because the acts were those of his servants. Had
the carrier agreed by contract to strict liability for unseaworthi-
ness, however, it would have been liable and would have, in effect,
waived the benefit of the Fire Statute. 4
By contrast, in Porter v. Bank Line (The Polertc)27 5 the bill of
lading listed specific exceptions, including, "the teamer is not lia-
ble for, fire on board, in hulk or craft," but then stated at the
end of the list that "all the above exceptions are conditional on the
vessel being seaworthy when she sails on the voyage ,,27 The
court found that the carrier had expressly contracted that it would
be liable for cargo loss by fire if the vessel was unseaworthy 277
Thus, the carrier had contracted to be liable for cargo loss by fire
even if not caused by the carrier's negligence and thus had waived
the benefit of the Fire Statute.
The cases on waiver do not disclose a restrictive judicial ap-
proach designed to find waiver by the carrier with little evidence of
intent. Instead, courts try to estimate fairly the parties' intentions
and will not easily find a waiver of such important rights. An ex-
plicit statement that the carrier waives its rights under the Fire
Provisions, however, is not necessary so long as the contractual
language clearly shows that intent.
271. Id. at 428.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. "In no bill of lading is there an express warranty of seaworthiness." Id.
275. 17 F.2d 513 (E.D. Va. 1927), a/I'd, 25 F.2d 843, 1928 A.M.C. 761 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 278 U.S. 623 (1928).
276. 17 F.2d at 514.
277. Id.
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B. Deviation
A carrier also may lose the benefit of the Fire Provisions through
deviation. Under the general maritime law, deviation can drasti-
cally affect the carrier's rights in a carriage of goods relationship. 78
Because judicial interpretation can influence the breadth of the
doctrine of deviation, this section analyzes the treatment of devia-
tion in the Fire Provision context.
1. The Fourth Heresy- Deviaton Is Not a Tort
The Supreme Court has defined a deviation to be "a voluntary
departure, without necessity or reasonable cause, from the regular
and usual course of a voyage." '279 Another court spoke of "a depar-
ture from the course of a voyage designated in the contract of car-
riage."2 80 General maritime law holds the carrier absolutely liable
for any loss sustained to the cargo that it would not have sustained
but for the deviation. 28' Thus, if during the deviation the cargo is
damaged by some cause totally outside the carrier's control, such
as a lightning bolt, the carrier nevertheless is liable. The carrier's
only means of avoiding liability is to show that the same damage
would have occurred even if the vessel had not deviated.282 The
reason for this rule is linked to early maritime insurance contracts
in which insurance coverage terminated upon deviation because
the cargo might encounter perils unanticipated in the contracted
course. Because the carrier controlled the deviating vessel, the ap-
propriate policy was for the carrier to bear the risks of cargo dam-
age that would not have resulted but for the deviation.28
This "insurance risk" analysis shows that deviation clearly is a
contract concept rather than a tort concept. In The Indrapura
28 4
278. See generally 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 12-3 to 12-32 (general explanation of
deviation); GiLMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 176-83 (effect of deviation).
279. Hostetter v. Park, 137 U.S. 30, 40 (1890).
280. American Cyanamid Co. v. Booth S.S. Co., 99 F Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1951), afl'd sub
nom., Feuer v. Booth S.S. Co., 195 F.2d 529 (2d Cir. 1952).
281. See The S.S. Willdomino v. Citro Chem. Co., 272 U.S. 718, 725, 1927 A.M.C. 129
(1927); Nemeth v. General S.S. Co., 694 F.2d 609, 612 (9th Cir. 1982); see also 2A BENEDICT,
supra note 8, at 30 (any deviation removes Fire Provision protection).
282. See, e.g., The Indrapura, 171 F 929, 939 (D. Ore. 1909).
283. See GiMoRE & BLACK, supra note 7, at 176-77.
284. 171 F 929 (D. Or. 1909).
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the court said that deviation "is a breach of the contract of freight-
ment"2 85 and discussed deviation throughout in contract terms.
Because many expectations as to risk are based on the route of the
voyage, the chosen route is a key section of a contract for carriage
of goods. Further, the use of the words "customary" and "usual" 86
to describe the standards for appraisal of claims of deviation sug-
gests an attempt to define the expectations of parties as to risks
contemplated when signing a bill of lading or a charter party
Recent extensions of the doctrine of deviation further support
the notion that deviation should be considered a breach of con-
tract. In the United States, for example, the stowage of cargo on
deck is considered to be a deviation when stowage below deck is
called for by custom or contract. 28 7 Under the American law, devia-
tion no longer is limited to a physical departure from the con-
tracted voyage, but includes any action leading to a significant new
risk not contemplated by the contracting parties for which the
cargo owner might have chosen to avoid or to plan for had it been
anticipated. Liability for deviation is strict. So great is the impor-
tance to the cargo that there be no deviation, the carrier's implied
promise not to deviate is treated as tantamount to an implied
warranty 288
This maritime doctrine of deviation and the absolute liability
that flows from it is much more comprehensible in contract than in
tort. Liability for deviation is unconcerned with whether the devia-
tion occurred intentionally or through neglect. Whether, in terms
of reasonable foreseeability, the deviation was even safer for the
cargo is likewise irrelevant. Finally, COGSA speaks of deviation as
285. Id. at 931.
286. Hostetter v. Park, 137 U.S. 30, 38 (1890); The Delaware, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 579
(1872); see 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 12-4.
287. Searoad Shipping Co. v. E.I. dupont de Nemours and Co., 361 F.2d 833, 834-35 (5th
Cir.), cert dented, 385 U.S. 973 (1966); 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 12-10.
288. See The Pelotas, 43 F.2d 571, 579 (E.D. La. 1930), aff'd, 66 F.2d 75, 1933 A.M.C.
1188 (5th Cir. 1933) (stating that " every bill of lading in default of special provision
contains on implied warranty that the voyage will be prosecuted without unnecessary delay
of deviation, and that if the vessel does unjustifiably deviate from her direct course the
carrier from the moment becomes the insurer of goods " Id., see also GILMORE &
BLACK, supra note 7, at 66. "Similar m operation to the seaworthiness warranty, though
taking effect later in the cause of the voyage, is the doctrine of 'deviation.'" Id.
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a "breach of the contract of carriage," '289 rather than as a vio-
lation of maritime tort law 290 The COGSA deviation provision
reduces damages for an "unreasonable deviation," one that is the
special type of breach of contract we have described, to the mea-
sure that "results from," that proximately flows from the deviation
itself.291
2. The Doctrinal Relationship of Deviation and the Fire
Provisions
The Fire Provisions are statutory restrictions on negligence ac-
tions against a carrier for fire damage to cargo. The Fire Provisions
eliminate vicarious liability, leaving as the only basis of liability
conduct directly attributable to the carrier.2 92 "Design or neglect"
are terms of intent or negligence, again suggesting tort causes of
action. COGSA's fire provisions speaks of "fault or privity" Fault,
like design or neglect, is a tort concept. Privity brings to mind con-
tractual theory, suggesting a difference in bases of liability between
the Fire Statute and COGSA. By its own terms, however, COGSA
does not alter the carrier's rights and obligations under the Fire
Statute, and the legislative history of COGSA expressly disaffirms
any intent to alter the Fire Statute's meaning of "design" or "neg-
lect" 293 Furthermore, courts consistently have held the terms to
have identical meanings. 94 Because the history of the two Fire
Provisions is bound up in the problem of allocating the burden of
risk for negligent fire damage to cargo, both provisions are tort-
related regimes.
Neither of the Fire Provisions deal with contract claims for lia-
bility due to fire damage. Because the Fire Provisions are partial
exonerations from tort liability, they are inapplicable to breach of
contract actions. In the absence of personal neglect a carrier is not
liable for fire damage in tort; however, if the carrier expressly con-
289. 46 U.S.C. § 1304(4) (1982).
290. See GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 7, at § 3-40.
291. Id. at 180.
292. See supra notes 25, 69-97 and accompanying text.
293. See 46 U.S.C. § 1308 (1982), wherein COGSA leaves the Fire Statute unmodified;
see also supra note 168.
294. For a recent statement of the proposition, see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. MN Les-
lie Lykes, 734 F.2d 199, 205 n.3 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 577 (1984).
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tracts to protect cargo from the damage, the carrier can be sued on
its contract. The Fire Provisions leave the carrier free to contract
and the Provisions in no way affect liability under that contract.
Because deviation is a breach of contract, any action based on
deviation falls outside the reach of the Fire Provisions. In the case
of fire damage in the course of deviation, where COGSA is inappli-
cable, the only issue would be whether "but for" the deviation the
fire damage would not have occurred. If the COGSA deviation pro-
vision applies, instead of the general maritime doctrine, then the
causation question becomes the usual one: did the deviation itself
cause the fire damage? Under COGSA, if found to be reasonable, a
deviation must have been within the contemplation of the parties
and thus was not a breach. If the cargo owner has no other con-
tract action, then its only relief is in tort, and the Fire Provisions
then apply If the cargo owner proves unreasonable deviation, how-
ever, he has established a breach of contract. Under COGSA, the
nonbreaching party has the burden of proving that the damages
resulted from the breach. The normal contract rules for damages
resulting from breach apply
A second question posed under the COGSA deviation provision
is whether COGSA's section 1304(5) limitation-of-liability provi-
sion will apply and thus limit cargo owners to recovery of five hun-
dred dollars per "package" or freight unit. Prior to COGSA, devia-
tion, as a fundamental breach of the carriage contract,295 deprived
the carrier of any contractual limitation of liability and of the ben-
efit of the Limitation Act.296 Under COGSA, in the Second and
Ninth Circuits the benefit of Section 1304(5) is lost.291 7 In the Sev-
enth Circuit,2 98 the provision still applies. If COGSA does not ap-
295. See St. Johns N.F Shipping Corp. v. S.A. Companhia Geral Commercial do Rio de
Janeiro, 263 U.S. 119, 124 (1923).
296. See 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 12-30. This is so, at least where the shipowner
orders or knowingly permits the deviation. See also The Pelotas, 43 F.2d 571, 579-80 (E.D.
La. 1930), af'd, 66 F.2d 75 (5th Cir. 1933).
297. In the Second Circuit, see Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc. v. S.S. Hong Kong Pro-
ducer, 422 F.2d 7, 1969 A.M.C. 1741 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 964 (1970); Jones
v. The Flying Clipper, 116 F Supp. 386, 1954 A.M.C. 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). In the Ninth
Circuit, see Nemeth v. General S.S. Corp., 694 F.2d 609, 613, 1983 A.M.C. 885 (9th Cir.
1982).
298. See, e.g., Atlantic Mutual Ins. Co. v. Poseidon Schiffhart, G.M.B.H., 313 F.2d 872,
1963 A.M.C. 665 (7th Cir.), cert. dented, 375 U.S. 819 (1963).
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ply, not only will the easier rule as to causation apply, but also
there is no limitation on liability
In The Indrapura,99 the carrier placed the carrying vessel in dry
dock in Hong Kong for maintenance after the ship took on a load
of general cargo consigned from Hong Kong to Portland, Oregon. A
fire broke out on the ship while in dry dock and damaged the
cargo. The court found that the fire resulted from the negligence of
the officers and crew The cargo owner sued for damages, claiming
deviation due to the delay and detour involved in sending the ship
into dry dock. The carrier raised the Fire Statute as a defense and
claimed no liability because the deviation had not caused the fire.
The court found that sending the ship into dry dock was a devia-
tion and rejected the application of the Fire Statute to the situa-
tion. The court pointed out that a suit based on deviation is a suit
for breach of contract. Placing the ship in dry dock for general
maintenance for the owner's convenience "was an act beyond ques-
tion not contemplated by the shipper, and was assuredly a breach
of the implied contract that the ship should remain upon the water
and proceed with all practicable dispatch to destination. '30 0
The court further pointed out that the established law for dam-
ages for deviation went beyond the normal "reasonable foreseeabil-
ity" rule for damages for breach of contract. For deviation, the car-
rier is liable for any damage to cargo occurring from any cause,
regardless of foreseeability, that the cargo would not have sus-
tained had it not been for the deviation.3 01 In The Indrapura, the
fire most likely would not have happened had the ship made the
voyage. The court's reasoning as to the different rule for deviation
suggests that the justification for the difference in doctrine as to
damages was that normal breaches of contract, such as unreasona-
ble delay in speed during the voyage, are anticipated risks, while a
deviation exposes cargo to new risks.3"2
The court went on to discuss the application of the Fire Statute
299. 171 F 929, 930-31 (D. Or. 1909). We refer to "carrier" in the text for convenience.
The Indrapura was under charter at the time, so charterer was the carrier. The owner
placed the vessel in the dry dock, with the consent of the carrier. On the relation of devia-
tion and the Fire Provisions, see 2A BENEDICT, supra note 8, at 12-25 to 12-29.
300. 171 F at 933.
301. Id. at 938.
302. Id. at 938-39.
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and limitation of liability under the Limitation Act. The court re-
jected as unreasonable any application of the Fire Statute.3 03 The
deviation, the breach of contract, already had occurred and the
normal legal consequences of the breach would apply The Fire
Statute, protecting the carrier from liability for "loss by fire where
it is not attributable to the carrier's personal negligence," was ir-
relevant.3 0 4 Therefore, the fact that the Fire Statute is read into all
contracts of carriage adds nothing, and the effect of breach of con-
tract by deviation is to bar use of all contract exemptions favoring
carrier. "There was a deviation, and while the respondent was pur-
posely at fault the fire occurred. If it can be shown that the fire
would have occurred notwithstanding the deviation, this would be
a defense. But the burden is cast upon the respondent to maintain
that defense. ",305
In summary, the court in The Indrapura clearly viewed devia-
tion as a breach of contract. The fact that fire was the event that
caused the cargo damage after the carrier had breached the con-
tract of carriage by deviation was unimportant. The carrier was lia-
ble on the basis of contract law for all damage occurring after the
vessel had deviated unless the carrier could prove conclusively that
the fire would have occurred and would have damaged the cargo
without the deviation. The Indrapura is clear authority that devia-
tion doctrine and the Fire Provisions operate in two separate fields
of liability; deviation in contract and the Fire Provisions in tort, to
restrict carrier liability for negligent cargo damage to conduct di-
rectly attributable to the carrier.
In The Ida,306 a general cargo vessel loaded bags of nitrate soda
in Hopewell, Virginia for carriage to Alexandria, Egypt. Rather
than proceeding directly to Egypt, at the direction of the carrier,
the ship called at ports in the Gulf of Mexico and along the Italian
coast. After the Ida finally arrived at Alexandria, approximately
two months after leaving Hopewell, and while she was discharging
303. Id. at 939.
304. Id.
305. Id. The court cited an American and British Encyclopedia of law that stated that m
deviation cases, a presumption arises tht the loss was caused by the deviation, and the car-
rier has to show that the loss not only might have happened, but must have happened even
if the deviation had not occurred. Id.
306. 75 F.2d 278, 1935 A.M.C. 302 (2d Cir. 1935).
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the nitrate, a fire of unknown origin broke out in a hold containing
some of the nitrate. The nitrate remaining on board was damaged
by the fire and water. 307 The cause of the fire was unknown. The
Second Circuit Court stated that exoneration under the Fire Stat-
ute is absolute unless the owner's neglect caused the fire:
The language of the statute is very broad. No owner of a vessel
is liable to cargo for fire damage 'unless such fire is caused by
the design or neglect of such owner.' Except as limited by the
clause just quoted, the immunity is complete There is no
claim that the fire was caused by the design of the
respondent 08
Assuming that a breach of contract by deviation might be
termed "neglect" to perform it, the court stated that the cargo
owner had shown no causal connection between the deviation and
the fire, and therefore no liability existed:
In a vague way a breach by failure to perform a contract may be
a "neglect" to perform it. Perhaps that depends upon whether
the breach is intentional or inadvertent. But we need not in-
dulge in any such nice distinctions now [Djeviation was a
"neglect" within the meaning of the word as used in the fire
statute [T]he neglect which will deprive a shipowner of
the protection is a neglect which caused the fire. 9
The court in The Ida did not believe its decision was contrary to
The Indrapura. "It was recognized in that case that the fire stat-
ute applied notwithstanding a deviation which had no causal rela-
tion to the fire."'3 10 The court also relied heavily on the then recent
Supreme Court case of Earle & Stoddart v. Ellerman's Wilson
Line.31
One finds difficulty in making sense of The Ida's characteriza-
tion of The Indrapura. The Indrapura held the Fire Statute not to
apply if there was a good cause of action seeking damages for
deviation. There can only be a good cause of action seeking dam-
age for deviation if there is at least a "but for" relationship of the
307. Id. at 278.
308. Id. at 279.
309. Id. (emphasis added).
310. Id. at 280.
311. Id. at 279 (citing Earle & Stoddart, 287 U.S. at 420, 1933 A.M.C. at 1).
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deviation to the damage suffered. If there is no causal relation to
the damage, as when the damage would have occurred if there had
been no deviation, then there is no action for deviation. For exam-
ple, if a vessel deviates and a fire begins at that time, there is no
causal relation between the deviation and the fire. If the vessel had
stayed on its proper course the fire would have started, the cargo
still would have been on board, and the cargo would have burned.
Further, as shown in The Indrapura, the test in deviation law is
not whether there is any causal relation to the risk, that which
causes the damage, but only to damage sustained. Thus, although a
crucial issue under the Fire Provisions is whether the carrier
caused the fire which damaged cargo, under deviation law, the is-
sue is not whether the deviation caused the fire. The very phrasing
of the problem in that fashion commits the heresy of confusing the
contract basis of the deviation doctrine with the tort basis of the
Fire Provisions.
The major problem in The Ida decision, however, is that the
court misunderstood or ignored the conceptual framework applied
by the court in The Indrapura. If the carrier has deviated, the car-
rier has fundamentally breached its contract. That contractual
wrong, under the general maritime law of deviation, strips the car-
rier of all protection as to cargo damage occurring while in devia-
tion. The only remaining issue is the "but for" connection for dam-
ages suffered, with the heavy burden on the carrier to overcome
the presumption of causation. In that analysis, the Fire Statute is
irrelevant because the Fire Statute says there is no actionable
wrong of the carrier for fire damage until the cargo owner estab-
lishes directly negligent conduct of the carrier that caused the fire.
The deviation analysis in breach of contract says that any negli-
gence by the carrier as to the fire risk is irrelevant to the question
of whether the carrier has deviated in violation of the contract. Be-
cause negligence is not the basis for actionable deviation, neither
reasonable forseeability of risk of harm nor the question of
whether the conduct breached a duty of reasonable care matter in
the law of deviation.
To insert the Fire Statute into a deviation analysis often could
destroy the general action for maritime deviation. Even if mere
deviation was an acceptable substitute for a showing of intent or
negligence as to fire, which the court in The Ida assumed, the
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cargo owner would have to show (1) that it was the carrier person-
ally who deviated, and (2) that the carrier personally caused the
fire. The COGSA deviation action calls for the damage to result
from the deviation, requiring the normal proximate-cause test.
Even under that restricted statutory basis for deviation damages,
however, the COGSA Fire Provision, if applied in fire damage
cases, likewise would defeat many deviation actions. For example,
if a ship carries cargo beyond the port of delivery to another port,
that is a clear case of deviation. If a fire breaks out on the ship and
spreads to that cargo, damage has resulted from the deviation
under the COGSA deviation provision. The deviation, however, did
not cause the fire.
In terms of doctrine, The Ida court took a contract action, the
deviation action, and forced it into a statutory framework con-
cerned with allocating the burden of loss from negligent cargo
damage by fire. Confusion inevitably resulted. The Fire Provisions
were enacted to deal with cases of tortious damage to cargo by fire.
The court in The Ida recognized that if the carrier had a specific
contractual obligation regarding fire, the Fire Statute would not
apply to the contract action because the carrier is bound to its con-
tract. An express warranty of seaworthiness provision in the bill of
lading waives protection of the Fire Provisions,312 because the car-
rier agrees to be strictly liable for damages from unseaworthiness,
however caused. In that situation, whether the carrier was person-
ally negligent is irrelevant for the contract action, and the Su-
preme Court in Earle & Stoddart 13 noted that regardless of
whether the Fire Statute prevented tort liability, contractual liabil-
ity for fire damage could exist under an express warranty of sea-
worthiness (while finding none in that case). The Ida, however,
confused the Earle & Stoddart discussion on the alternative theory
of liability with that case's principal discussion on the Fire Stat-
ute's relationship to the duty of due diligence as to
seaworthiness.3 14
The court in The Ida failed to focus on the contractual nature of
deviation, with its special features, and the tort-oriented nature of
312. E.g., Earle & Stoddart Inc. v. Ellerman's Wilson Line, 287 U.S. 420, 428 (1932).
313. Id. at 428.
314. 75 F.2d at 279.
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the Fire Statute. Thus, the court confused a contract action with a
statute providing partial exoneration for tort liability. The decision
in The Ida provides greater effect to the Fire Provisions than is
required to satisfy congressional policy. Certainly, no judicial hos-
tility to the Fire Provisions is evidenced by the approach.
In Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co. v. United States (The Zaca),315
the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit followed
its decision in The Ida.316 In that case, the court held there was no
voluntary deviation in any event.31 In Hoskyn v. Silver Line, Ltd.
(The Silver Cypress),31 the ship negligently carried cargo to Ilo lo
in the Philippines, beyond the cargo's destination in Manila. A fire
broke out in Ilo Ilo and destroyed the cargo. The court refused to
apply The Ida on the ground that the facts were different. In this
case, the cargo was at the wrong port, Ilo Ilo, because of the devia-
tion at the time of the fire, while in The Ida, the cargo was where
it was supposed to be at the time of the fire, but arrived later than
it should have. The alleged deviation in The Ida was a wrongful
detour to other ports before arrival at the port of destination. The
court did not discuss the doctrine, but stated that, had there been
no fire, the cargo owners conceivably would have had a cause of
action. Therefore, "it is not logical to say that by reason of the
failure to discharge its obligation to make delivery at Manila, the
[carrier] is entitled to the same protection under the Fire Statute
as it successfully asserted with respect to cargo intended for, but
not yet discharged at Ilo Ilo. ' '319 Upon appeal the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed without discuss-
ing this issue.
The Hoskyn case is contrary to the holding in The Ida. The Ida
says that if fire causes the damage, the cargo owner has to meet
the requirements of the Fire Statute. The Ida required a showing
of a "causal connection" between the deviation and the fire. Al-
though cargo owners in Hoskyn could not prove the cause of the
fire, carrying these items of cargo on to lo Ilo was certainly not the
315. 105 F.2d 160, 1939 A.M.C. 912 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 308 U.S. 611 (1939).
316. Id. at 166.
317. Id. at 167.
318. 63 F Supp. 452, 1943 A.M.C. 510 (S.D.N.Y. 1943), af'd, 143 F.2d 462, 1944 A.M.C.
895 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 767 (1944).
319. Id. at 468.
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cause. If we focus on the damage, however, as is correct in devia-
tion law, then clearly the damage to the cargo would not have oc-
curred but for the overcarriage to Ilo Ilo. This is a classic case of a
good cause of action for deviation. When the Hoskyn court rea-
soned that (1) there might have been an action for damages for
overcarriage had there been no fire, and (2) that it is illogical to
say that because of its overcarriage, the carrier should have the
protection of the Fire Statute just as the carrier did for cargo actu-
ally destined for Ilo Ilo, the court simply is saying that taking an
already established liability in contract and saying the cargo owner
must qualify in tort through the Fire Statute appears ridiculous.
In Haroco Co. v. The Tat Shan,320 the Tai Shan was a general
cargo vessel engaged in service between ports in the Far East and
the United States. At Tientsin, China, the ship took on cargo des-
tined primarily for United States ports. The ship then called at
ports in the Philippines and Japan before reaching the United
States. While at Cebu in the Philippines, fire broke out and dam-
aged some cargo. The claim of the cargo owner was that calling at
ports in the Philippines was a deviation. The court first held that
there had been no deviation. 321 Calls to the Philippines, of the du-
ration in this case, were customary in Far East-United States gen-
eral cargo carriage. Second, the court was bound by the Second
Circuit rule in The Ida and Globe calling for a "causal connection"
between the deviation and the fire and placing the burden of proof
on the cargo owner. The court did note that the burden rule of the
Second Circuit was contrary to that announced in The Indrapura,
but showed no evidence of recognizing why The Indrapura, in re-
jecting the application of the Fire Statute, dealt with allocation of
the burden of proof as to "but for" causation in a cargo owner's
action for breach of contract arising from deviation. The Ida and
Globe decisions, requiring the application of the Fire Statute,
stated the usual burden of proof of the cargo owner to show cause
of fire.
The court in Haroco quoted the factual distinction made in Hos-
kyn without commenting on how the distinction would avoid the
320. 111 F Supp. 638, 1953 A.M.C. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), aff'd 218 F.2d 822, 1955 A.M.C.
420 (2d Cir. 1955).
321. Id. at 645.
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"causal connection with the fire" rule of The Ida and Globe.322 The
court said that cargo owners had not shown that if the vessel had
not gone to the Philippines, the cargo would have been delivered
before the fire occurred. The court then suggested that "it might
be urged that, in any case where a vessel, proceeding by a direct
route, would have discharged her cargo before the date of a fire
which damaged the cargo during a deviation, there must have been
a causal connection between the deviation and the fire. ' 323 A good
deviation action could be made out on those facts. The "but for"
relationship between deviation and the damage suffered is present.
There is, however, no "must" causal connection with the fire. If,
due to the delay time or an event occurring in the deviation, the
cargo caught fire, a causal connection would exist between the
deviation and the fire. If a fuel line broke, however, or some other
event totally unconnected with the cargo started a fire elsewhere in
the ship, then no causal relation exists with the fire, only the fire
damage (cargo would have been delivered earlier had it not been
for the deviation). In any event, the apparent desire of the Haroco
court to give relief in such a situation would accord with The
Indrapura.
The Hoskyn and Haroco holdings suggest that district courts m
the Second Circuit may be promoting a more accurate analysis of
the relationship between deviation and the Fire Provisions. The
lack of cases suggests that the combination of fire and deviation
cases, and therefore the opportunities to alter the law, may be few.
Most cases will appear in the Second Circuit, however. The cases
on the relationship of deviation to the Fire Provision assuredly in-
dicate no judicial hostility to giving proper effect to those statutes.
VIII. CONCLUSION
It is a heretic that makes the fire .324
In providing a comprehensive outline of modern American mari-
time law regarding fire damage to cargo, this Article points out
four "heresies" that threaten the traditional application of fire
322. Id. at 646.
323. Id. at 647.
324. W. SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER'S TALE, Act III, sc. iii, 1.118 (Great Books ed., 1952).
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damage law The first heresy, the intertwining of the Limitation
Act and the Fire Provisions, was committed by Gilmore and Black
primarily Analysis of Fire Provision cases illustrates that courts
are not allowing current judicial hostility to the Limitation Act to
spill onto the Fire Provisions improperly The courts, therefore,
avoid the first heresy by recognizing the history and policy distinc-
tions between the Limitation Act and the Fire Provisions.
The second heresy is the confusion of the maritime doctrine of
unseaworthiness with the Fire Provisions. The third heresy is
closely related: the application of Maxine Footwear and the Cana-
dian COGSA to American law, allowing the doctrine of unseawor-
thiness to override the Fire Provisions. Through analysis of Asbes-
tos Corp. and Sunkist Growers, this Article has argued that the
doctrine of unseaworthiness is distinct and that differing policies
dictate separate treatment for the Fire Provisions.
The fourth heresy is the confusion of the doctrine of deviation
with the Fire Provisions. Because deviation is a contract based
cause of action, application of the tort-based Fire Provision analy-
sis to deviation cases is inappropriate and confusing. In discussing
The Ida and The Indrapura, this Article distinguishes the
doctrines.
The Fire Provisions are alive and well. In determining whether
courts restrictively interpret the Fire Provisions, this Article ex-
amined qualifications for eligibility, major substantive and proce-
dural aspects of the Fire Provisions, the judicial standards for de-
termining personal negligence of the carrier, and, finally, ways that
the carrier could lose Fire Provision protection. Examination of
each of these issues illustrates that the trial and appellate courts
are engaged in fair-minded, thorough appraisal of the evidence in
each case, and that the carrier is not being deprived unduly of the
benefit of the Fire Provisions. In the American maritime law of fire
damage to cargo, the courts generally have kept the destructive fire
from these heresies small. That is all the reason more, in Shake-
speare's words, for having those heresies "quickly trodden out."
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